Journal article · 2006
The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders
Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), 26(2), 153–154 · Published 1 January 2006
In brief
“The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders” is a 2006 journal article by 王庆东 and 2 co-authors, published in Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences). OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 19 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.
- Citations
- 0
- Authors
- 3
Abstract
传统公司治理都和股东与管理者间的利益冲突有关。1976年Jensen和Meckling提出股权分离学说,认为管理者倾向于自身效用最大化而不是股东价值最大化。本文拟运用具体的分析框架,从研究道德风险和逆向选择的代理问题入手,来重新审视关于价值转移的争论。 Read the full abstract at the publisher.
Excerpt. This paper is not open access.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
王庆东, 韩飞, & 穆智莉. (2006). The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders. Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), 26(2), 153–154. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002
MLA 9
王庆东, et al. “The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders.” Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), vol. 26, no. 2, 2006, pp. 153–154. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002.
Chicago
王庆东, 韩飞, and 穆智莉. 2006. “The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders.” Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences) 26 (2): 153–154. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002.
Harvard
王庆东, 韩飞 and 穆智莉 (2006) ‘The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders’, Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), 26(2), pp. 153–154. Available at: https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002.
IEEE
王庆东, 韩飞, and 穆智莉, “The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders,” Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 153–154, 2006.
BibTeX
@article{2006optimal,
title = {{The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders}},
author = {王庆东 and 韩飞 and 穆智莉},
journal = {Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)},
year = {2006},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
pages = {153--154},
url = {https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- principal-agent problem
- optimal contracts
- moral hazard
- adverse selection
- separation of ownership and control
- agency theory
- shareholder protection
- private benefits
Work with this paper
Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureMichael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling · Journal of Financial Economics · 1976 · 77,585 citations
- Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformanceDouglass C. North · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1990 · 34,377 citations
- The MOS 36-item short-form health survey (SF-36). I. Conceptual framework and item selection.John E. Ware, Cathy Donald Sherbourne · PubMed · 1992 · 33,943 citations
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsManuel Arellano, Stephen R. Bond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1991 · 33,778 citations
- Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and TestingRobert F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger · Econometrica · 1987 · 32,847 citations
Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
王庆东, 韩飞, & 穆智莉. (2006). The Optimal Contract within Principal-agent Framework——the Equilibrium among the Compensation Contracts,Private Benefits and Protection of Shareholders. Journal of Hebei University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences), 26(2), 153–154. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=HBKS200604002
How many times has this paper been cited?
0 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.
Who wrote this paper?
王庆东, 韩飞, 穆智莉.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.