Journal article · 2004

Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies

苏启林

China Industrial Economy, 100–106 · Published 1 January 2004

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In brief

“Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies” is a 2004 journal article by 苏启林, published in China Industrial Economy. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 19 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.

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Abstract

本文运用代理理论对2002年在上海、深圳证券交易所上市的122家民营上市公司治理与企业价值进行理论分析与实证检验,发现民营上市公司治理包括在股权集中度、债务融资比重、金字塔式控股、控制权与现金流权偏离、流通股与非流通股价偏离等五个方向上存在着代理冲突,并指出引发民营上市公司代理冲突的首要原因是现行流通股与非流通股的股权割裂。 Read the full abstract at the publisher.

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Cite this paper

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APA 7

苏启林. (2004). Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies. China Industrial Economy, 100–106. http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html

MLA 9

苏启林. “Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies.” China Industrial Economy, no. 4, 2004, pp. 100–106. http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html.

Chicago

苏启林. 2004. “Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies.” China Industrial Economy (4): 100–106. http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html.

Harvard

苏启林 (2004) ‘Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies’, China Industrial Economy, pp. 100–106. Available at: http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html.

IEEE

苏启林, “Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies,” China Industrial Economy, no. 4, pp. 100–106, 2004.

BibTeX

@article{2004agency,
  title     = {{Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies}},
  author    = {苏启林},
  journal   = {China Industrial Economy},
  year      = {2004},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {100--106},
  url       = {http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • principal-agent problem
  • corporate governance
  • firm value
  • ownership concentration
  • debt financing
  • listed companies
  • Chinese stock market

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

苏启林. (2004). Agency Problem, Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from Chinese Listed Private-controlled Companies. China Industrial Economy, 100–106. http://www.cqvip.com/QK/93800A/2004004/9598566.html

How many times has this paper been cited?

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Who wrote this paper?

苏启林.

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