Journal article · 2019 · Open access
Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(8), 2431–2465 · Published 18 October 2019 · DOI 10.1017/s0022109019000851
In brief
“Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information” is a 2019 journal article by Leonce L. Bargeron and Alice A. Bonaimé, published in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. OpenAlex counts 27 citations as of 19 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Citations
- 27
- Most cited in
- 2025 (6)
- Field-weighted impact
- 2.28
- References
- 67
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Bargeron, L. L., & Bonaimé, A. A. (2019). Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(8), 2431–2465. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851
MLA 9
Bargeron, Leonce L., and Alice A. Bonaimé. “Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 55, no. 8, 2019, pp. 2431–2465. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851.
Chicago
Bargeron, Leonce L. and Alice A. Bonaimé. 2019. “Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55 (8): 2431–2465. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851.
Harvard
Bargeron, L. L. and Bonaimé, A. A. (2019) ‘Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(8), pp. 2431–2465. doi:10.1017/s0022109019000851.
IEEE
L. L. Bargeron and A. A. Bonaimé, “Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 2431–2465, 2019, doi: 10.1017/s0022109019000851.
BibTeX
@article{bargeron2019firms,
title = {{Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information}},
author = {Bargeron, Leonce L. and Bonaimé, Alice A.},
journal = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
year = {2019},
volume = {55},
number = {8},
pages = {2431--2465},
doi = {10.1017/s0022109019000851},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 1 | |
| 2021 | 4 | |
| 2022 | 5 | |
| 2023 | 2 | |
| 2024 | 5 | |
| 2025 | 6 | |
| 2026 | 4 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 2.28: it has been cited 2.28 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
- short sellers
- share repurchases
- managerial myopia
- private information
- short interest
- overvalued stocks
- activist investors
- abnormal returns
Work with this paper
Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureMichael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling · Journal of Financial Economics · 1976 · 77,585 citations
- Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformanceDouglass C. North · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1990 · 34,377 citations
- The MOS 36-item short-form health survey (SF-36). I. Conceptual framework and item selection.John E. Ware, Cathy Donald Sherbourne · PubMed · 1992 · 33,943 citations
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsManuel Arellano, Stephen R. Bond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1991 · 33,778 citations
- Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and TestingRobert F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger · Econometrica · 1987 · 32,847 citations
Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Bargeron, L. L., & Bonaimé, A. A. (2019). Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(8), 2431–2465. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851
How many times has this paper been cited?
27 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Leonce L. Bargeron, Alice A. Bonaimé.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1017/s0022109019000851, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.