Preprint · 2018 · Open access

Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?

Kornelia Fabisik, Ruediger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz, Jérôme P. Taillard

Published 20 December 2018 · DOI 10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018

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In brief

“Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?” is a 2018 preprint by Kornelia Fabisik and 3 co-authors. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read.

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Abstract

Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature, showing that there is an increasing and concave relation between q and managerial ownership. We show that these seemingly contradictory results are explained by cumulative past performance and liquidity. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin’s q.

Cite this paper

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APA 7

Fabisik, K., Fahlenbrach, R., Stulz, R. M., & Taillard, J. P. (2018). Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less? https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018

MLA 9

Fabisik, Kornelia, et al. “Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?” 2018. https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018.

Chicago

Fabisik, Kornelia, Ruediger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz, and Jérôme P. Taillard. 2018. “Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?” https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018.

Harvard

Fabisik, K. et al. (2018) ‘Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?’. doi:10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018.

IEEE

K. Fabisik, R. Fahlenbrach, R. M. Stulz, and J. P. Taillard, “Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?,” 2018, doi: 10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018.

BibTeX

@misc{fabisik2018firms,
  title     = {{Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?}},
  author    = {Fabisik, Kornelia and Fahlenbrach, Ruediger and Stulz, René M. and Taillard, Jérôme P.},
  year      = {2018},
  doi       = {10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • managerial ownership
  • Tobin's Q
  • firm value
  • initial public offerings
  • firm liquidity
  • share issuance
  • ownership structure

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Fabisik, K., Fahlenbrach, R., Stulz, R. M., & Taillard, J. P. (2018). Why Are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less? https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access: read the free full text.

Who wrote this paper?

Kornelia Fabisik, Ruediger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz, Jérôme P. Taillard.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-587-2018.

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