Journal article · 2026 · Open access

When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil

Fernando Mello

American Political Science Review, 1–16 · Published 30 October 2026 · DOI 10.1017/s0003055426101865

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In brief

“When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil” is a 2026 journal article by Fernando Mello, published in American Political Science Review. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 16 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at American Political Science Review.

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Abstract

The influence of interest groups on policy making is a central concern in representative democracies, yet identifying causal effects remains a significant challenge. This article argues that legislators respond to informational cues about the economic importance and coalition breadth of interest groups. A field experiment in Brazil, which randomized the receipt of printed and WhatsApp messages from a pro-reform business organization, reveals that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the group’s position when its membership size, economic importance, and sectoral reach are emphasized. A survey experiment with lobbyists supports this mechanism, showing that messages highlighting group characteristics increase legislators’ expected engagement and support. In-depth interviews with key political figures—including a former president, ministers, and deputies—further corroborate these findings. This study contributes to the literature on informational lobbying and cue-based persuasion by employing realistic experimental treatments and mixed-methods evidence.

Cite this paper

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APA 7

Mello, F. (2026). When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil. American Political Science Review, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865

MLA 9

Mello, Fernando. “When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil.” American Political Science Review, 2026, pp. 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865.

Chicago

Mello, Fernando. 2026. “When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil.” American Political Science Review: 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865.

Harvard

Mello, F. (2026) ‘When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil’, American Political Science Review, pp. 1–16. doi:10.1017/s0003055426101865.

IEEE

F. Mello, “When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil,” American Political Science Review, pp. 1–16, 2026, doi: 10.1017/s0003055426101865.

BibTeX

@article{mello2026when,
  title     = {{When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil}},
  author    = {Mello, Fernando},
  journal   = {American Political Science Review},
  year      = {2026},
  pages     = {1--16},
  doi       = {10.1017/s0003055426101865},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

  • interest groups
  • lobbying
  • informational lobbying
  • legislators
  • corporate lobbying
  • WhatsApp messages
  • legislative voting
  • Brazil

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Mello, F. (2026). When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil. American Political Science Review, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 16 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at American Political Science Review: sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Fernando Mello.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1017/s0003055426101865, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055426101865. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 16 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.