Paper · 2015 · Open access

Wages vs. ownership

Dan Weltmann

Published 1 January 2015 · DOI 10.7282/t33n2546

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“Wages vs. ownership” is a 2015 paper by Dan Weltmann. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 18 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University).

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Abstract

Efficiency wage theory suggests that paying workers above the market or minimum rate can be more efficient for the firm, since the increased productivity more than pays for the increased wages. And yet, workers can be paid in stock, not just wages, and the two forms of compensation may motivate workers in different ways, leading to different outcomes, as well as affecting cash flow in different ways. Employee ownership as a form of efficiency wages has not been examined before, and given its potential to affect employee attitudes and behaviors as well as firm performance, it is worth investigating. Using data from employee surveys matched to average wages for comparable workers outside the firm, I examined both an objective measure of worker pay relative to the market and a subjective measure of workers’ perception of pay relative to the market. The general finding is that when wages were perceived as being below market, higher wages had a positive effect on a number of performance-related attitudes, but ownership did not. For wages above market, in contrast, ownership had positive effects on a number of attitudes. Whether the wages were below or above market, the employees’ perception of their pay relative to market pay was more important than what they were actually paid, which may reflect better information workers have about competitor local wages and conditions of employment. The results indicate that employee ownership may act like efficiency wages in some important respects, and may complement efficiency wages by having stronger effects when wages are above market.

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APA 7

Weltmann, D. (2015). Wages vs. ownership. https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546

MLA 9

Weltmann, Dan. “Wages vs. ownership.” 2015. https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546.

Chicago

Weltmann, Dan. 2015. “Wages vs. ownership.” https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546.

Harvard

Weltmann, D. (2015) ‘Wages vs. ownership’. doi:10.7282/t33n2546.

IEEE

D. Weltmann, “Wages vs. ownership,” 2015, doi: 10.7282/t33n2546.

BibTeX

@article{weltmann2015wages,
  title     = {{Wages vs. ownership}},
  author    = {Weltmann, Dan},
  year      = {2015},
  doi       = {10.7282/t33n2546},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Cooperative Studies and Economics

  • employee ownership
  • efficiency wages
  • stock compensation
  • wage perception
  • employee attitudes
  • firm performance
  • employee survey

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Weltmann, D. (2015). Wages vs. ownership. https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

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Yes. It is open access at Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University): sign in and open the full text from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Dan Weltmann.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.7282/t33n2546, permanently at https://doi.org/10.7282/t33n2546. Sign in and open it from this page.

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