Journal article · Open access
The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions
Journal of Business Strategies, 21(1), 69–94 · DOI 10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94
In brief
“The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions” is a journal article by James A. Sundali and Darryl A. Seale, published in Journal of Business Strategies. OpenAlex counts 5 citations as of 19 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY-NC licence: the full text is free to read at Journal of Business Strategies.
- Citations
- 5
- Most cited in
- 2023 (1)
- References
- 29
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
Signaling occurs when a firm attempts to indicate, truthfully or not, its intendedcourse of action. Competitors often use signaling in market entry situationsto coordinate actions, or possibly to deter entry by other firms. This paperexamines the value of cheap talk and costly signaling in a large group marketentry game. Eighty subjects, twenty in each of four groups, participated in acomputer-controlled decision making experiment. After learning the capacityof the market, subjects were given an opportunity to signal their intentions toenter or stay out. Following feedback of aggregate signals, subjects were askedto estimate the aggregate number of entry decisions they anticipated. Followingthe estimation task, subjects had to decide whether or not to enter the market,which varied in size from trial to trial. Results suggest that when no cost wasimposed on signals (cheap talk), players significantly exaggerated their intentionsto enter the market. When signals were costly, signaling behavior wasmore consistent with subsequent entry decisions. Overall, however, neithercheap talk nor costly signaling had much effect on actual market coordination,and aggregate results generally are consistent with Nash equilibrium predictions.The study concludes with a discussion of insights for researchers andmanagement practitioners.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Sundali, J. A., & Seale, D. A. (n.d.). The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions. Journal of Business Strategies, 21(1), 69–94. https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94
MLA 9
Sundali, James A., and Darryl A. Seale. “The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions.” Journal of Business Strategies, vol. 21, no. 1, n.d., pp. 69–94. https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94.
Chicago
Sundali, James A. and Darryl A. Seale. n.d.. “The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions.” Journal of Business Strategies 21 (1): 69–94. https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94.
Harvard
Sundali, J. A. and Seale, D. A. (n.d.) ‘The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions’, Journal of Business Strategies, 21(1), pp. 69–94. doi:10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94.
IEEE
J. A. Sundali and D. A. Seale, “The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions,” Journal of Business Strategies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 69–94, n.d., doi: 10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94.
BibTeX
@article{sundalivalue,
title = {{The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions}},
author = {Sundali, James A. and Seale, Darryl A.},
journal = {Journal of Business Strategies},
volume = {21},
number = {1},
pages = {69--94},
doi = {10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94},
url = {https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- cheap talk
- costly signaling
- market entry
- coordination
- entry deterrence
- signaling games
- Nash equilibrium
- market size
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Sundali, J. A., & Seale, D. A. (n.d.). The Value of Cheap-Talk and Costly Signals In Coordinating Market Entry Decisions. Journal of Business Strategies, 21(1), 69–94. https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94
How many times has this paper been cited?
5 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at Journal of Business Strategies: sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
James A. Sundali, Darryl A. Seale.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94, permanently at https://doi.org/10.54155/jbs.21.1.69-94. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.