Journal article · 2026 · Open access

The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair

Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan

Econometrica, 94(5), 1603–1650 · Published 1 January 2026 · DOI 10.3982/ecta23230

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In brief

“The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair” is a 2026 journal article by Marek Pycia and Peter Troyan, published in Econometrica. OpenAlex counts 9 citations as of 18 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at Econometrica.

Citations
9
Most cited in
2026 (5)
Field-weighted impact
16.31
References
26
Authors
2

Abstract

Random Priority is a popular mechanism used to allocate a set of objects to a set of agents without the use of monetary transfers. Random Priority is appealing because it satisfies desirable efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties. Is it the only mechanism with these properties? We answer this long‐standing question in the positive: Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is Pareto efficient, symmetric, and obviously strategy‐proof.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Pycia, M., & Troyan, P. (2026). The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair. Econometrica, 94(5), 1603–1650. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230

MLA 9

Pycia, Marek, and Peter Troyan. “The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair.” Econometrica, vol. 94, no. 5, 2026, pp. 1603–1650. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230.

Chicago

Pycia, Marek and Peter Troyan. 2026. “The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair.” Econometrica 94 (5): 1603–1650. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230.

Harvard

Pycia, M. and Troyan, P. (2026) ‘The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair’, Econometrica, 94(5), pp. 1603–1650. doi:10.3982/ecta23230.

IEEE

M. Pycia and P. Troyan, “The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair,” Econometrica, vol. 94, no. 5, pp. 1603–1650, 2026, doi: 10.3982/ecta23230.

BibTeX

@article{pycia2026random,
  title     = {{The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair}},
  author    = {Pycia, Marek and Troyan, Peter},
  journal   = {Econometrica},
  year      = {2026},
  volume    = {94},
  number    = {5},
  pages     = {1603--1650},
  doi       = {10.3982/ecta23230},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230}
}

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Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
202311
202533
202655

Its field-weighted citation impact is 16.31: it has been cited 16.31 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems

  • mechanism design
  • Pareto optimality
  • strategy-proofness
  • fairness
  • symmetry

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Pycia, M., & Troyan, P. (2026). The Random Priority Mechanism Is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair. Econometrica, 94(5), 1603–1650. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230

How many times has this paper been cited?

9 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at Econometrica: sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.3982/ecta23230, permanently at https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23230. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 18 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.