Dissertation · 2011
The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms
Repositório do ISCTE-IUL · Published 1 January 2011
In brief
“The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms” is a 2011 dissertation by Abel Camelo, published in Repositório do ISCTE-IUL. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 15 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.
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Abstract
O tema da Corporate Governance tem sido alvo de forte interesse nos últimos anos. A falta de compreensão dos níveis de remuneração dos CEO tem levado a um grande foco generalizado por parte da comunicação social, que se refere a esta como desadequada. Uma necessidade crescente de transparência na informação tem sido a preocupação central… Read the full abstract at the publisher.
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Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Camelo, A. (2011). The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms. Repositório do ISCTE-IUL. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244
MLA 9
Camelo, Abel. “The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms.” Repositório do ISCTE-IUL, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244.
Chicago
Camelo, Abel. 2011. “The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms.” Repositório do ISCTE-IUL. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244.
Harvard
Camelo, A. (2011) ‘The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms’, Repositório do ISCTE-IUL. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244.
IEEE
A. Camelo, “The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms,” Repositório do ISCTE-IUL, 2011.
BibTeX
@phdthesis{camelo2011monitors,
title = {{The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms}},
author = {Camelo, Abel},
year = {2011},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- executive compensation
- CEO compensation
- board of directors
- board oversight
- corporate governance
- corporate governance codes
- firm performance
- firm size
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Camelo, A. (2011). The monitors’ impact on the agents’ compensation: among the world’s largest firms. Repositório do ISCTE-IUL. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/4244
How many times has this paper been cited?
0 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
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Who wrote this paper?
Abel Camelo.
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