Journal article · 2026 · Open access

The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control

Mike C. Burkart, Samuel Lee, Paul Voß

The Journal of Finance · Published 30 October 2026 · DOI 10.1111/jofi.70099

Open PDFView at the publisherCite this paper

In brief

“The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control” is a 2026 journal article by Mike C. Burkart and 2 co-authors, published in The Journal of Finance. OpenAlex counts 2 citations as of 16 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at The Journal of Finance.

Citations
2
Most cited in
2024 (1)
Field-weighted impact
5.29
References
72
Authors
3

Abstract

We consider an informed large shareholder who can choose between making a takeover bid herself and initiating a sale to another acquirer. Such takeover activism complements direct takeovers because the very choice mitigates the asymmetric information problem, thereby improving efficiency. As more investors enter the market for corporate control, takeover activism increasingly replaces direct takeovers as the prevailing mode of disciplinary control change, matching the evolution in practice. Our model shows how this evolution, characterized by a symbiotic relationship between investor activism and private equity, arises to overcome asymmetric information and collective action problems through intermediated transactions.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Burkart, M. C., Lee, S., & Voß, P. (2026). The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099

MLA 9

Burkart, Mike C., et al. “The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control.” The Journal of Finance, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099.

Chicago

Burkart, Mike C., Samuel Lee, and Paul Voß. 2026. “The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control.” The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099.

Harvard

Burkart, M. C., Lee, S. and Voß, P. (2026) ‘The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control’, The Journal of Finance. doi:10.1111/jofi.70099.

IEEE

M. C. Burkart, S. Lee, and P. Voß, “The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control,” The Journal of Finance, 2026, doi: 10.1111/jofi.70099.

BibTeX

@article{burkart2026evolution,
  title     = {{The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control}},
  author    = {Burkart, Mike C. and Lee, Samuel and Voß, Paul},
  journal   = {The Journal of Finance},
  year      = {2026},
  doi       = {10.1111/jofi.70099},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099}
}

Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • corporate control
  • takeover bids
  • private equity
  • information asymmetry
  • collective action problems
  • corporate governance
  • takeover defenses
  • market for corporate control

Work with this paper

Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance

All highly cited Economics, Econometrics and Finance papers

Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Burkart, M. C., Lee, S., & Voß, P. (2026). The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099

How many times has this paper been cited?

2 times, according to OpenAlex on 16 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at The Journal of Finance: sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Mike C. Burkart, Samuel Lee, Paul Voß.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1111/jofi.70099, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.70099. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 16 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.