Journal article · 2022 · Open access
Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets
Operations Research, 70(5), 2784–2803 · Published 28 July 2022 · DOI 10.1287/opre.2022.2327
In brief
“Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets” is a 2022 journal article by Itai Ashlagi and 4 co-authors, published in Operations Research. OpenAlex counts 47 citations as of 21 November 2026, which puts it in the top 8% of works published in 2022 by citations. It is open access: the full text is free to read at arXiv (Cornell University).
- Citations
- 47
- Most cited in
- 2026 (15)
- Field-weighted impact
- 3.77
- References
- 30
- Authors
- 5
Abstract
Two-sided platforms, which enable two distinct groups of agents to match and transact with each other, are now ubiquitous in a variety of markets, such as those for labor, dating, and accommodation rentals. Many such online platforms, rather than determining who matches with whom in a centralized fashion, operate by presenting users with a set of recommended partners and allowing them to choose which of these to pursue a match with. Therefore, a question that is central to the operations of these platforms is how to optimize over the recommendations for potential partners that are presented to their users. A natural objective in many markets is to maximize the total number of transactions matches (e.g., the number of tasks completed) that occur through the platform. The platform must account for the fact that a match between two users occurs only when both users find each other acceptable and that when many conflicting requests are received at the same time, not all such requests can be accepted. To describe the tradeoff that then arises, let us refer to the two sides of the market as customers and suppliers, respectively, where we assume that customers (potential guests or clients) are presented with recommended assortments of potential suppliers (properties or freelancers) from which to choose. Naturally, increasing the number and mix of potential suppliers that a customer sees increases the chances that she finds an acceptable one to contact, instead of choosing not to pursue a match through the platform at all. However, if, as a result, the same supplier is shown to many customers, this would increase the chances that a supplier is contacted by many customers with conflicting requests at the same time, resulting in collisions when only one such request can be accepted. In a setting where suppliers are indeed products and do not have preferences, these collisions are bad for the platform, as the number of transactions could have been increased by redirecting some of these customers to other products. However, in a two-sided market, having a supplier receiving many requests might indeed increase the number of matches, as this may increase the chances she finds a customer she prefers to her outside option. Motivated by the above discussion, we study how to optimize over the assortments of recommended potential partners that are shown to each user to maximize the number of matches. Our contributions are twofold: We propose a novel stylized model that captures the aforementioned tradeoffs, and we construct a simple algorithm that achieves a constant-factor approximation…
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Ashlagi, I., Krishnaswamy, A. K., Makhijani, R. M., Sabán, D., & Shiragur, K. (2022). Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets. Operations Research, 70(5), 2784–2803. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327
MLA 9
Ashlagi, Itai, et al. “Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets.” Operations Research, vol. 70, no. 5, 2022, pp. 2784–2803. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327.
Chicago
Ashlagi, Itai, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul M. Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, and Kirankumar Shiragur. 2022. “Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets.” Operations Research 70 (5): 2784–2803. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327.
Harvard
Ashlagi, I. et al. (2022) ‘Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets’, Operations Research, 70(5), pp. 2784–2803. doi:10.1287/opre.2022.2327.
IEEE
I. Ashlagi, A. K. Krishnaswamy, R. M. Makhijani, D. Sabán, and K. Shiragur, “Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets,” Operations Research, vol. 70, no. 5, pp. 2784–2803, 2022, doi: 10.1287/opre.2022.2327.
BibTeX
@article{ashlagi2022technical,
title = {{Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets}},
author = {Ashlagi, Itai and Krishnaswamy, Anilesh K. and Makhijani, Rahul M. and Sabán, Daniela and Shiragur, Kirankumar},
journal = {Operations Research},
year = {2022},
volume = {70},
number = {5},
pages = {2784--2803},
doi = {10.1287/opre.2022.2327},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 3 | |
| 2021 | 5 | |
| 2022 | 2 | |
| 2023 | 6 | |
| 2024 | 10 | |
| 2025 | 6 | |
| 2026 | 15 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 3.77: it has been cited 3.77 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- assortment planning
- two-sided matching markets
- sequential matching
- digital platforms
- recommender systems
- collision avoidance
- approximation algorithms
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Ashlagi, I., Krishnaswamy, A. K., Makhijani, R. M., Sabán, D., & Shiragur, K. (2022). Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets. Operations Research, 70(5), 2784–2803. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327
How many times has this paper been cited?
47 times, according to OpenAlex on 21 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at arXiv (Cornell University): sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Itai Ashlagi, Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Rahul M. Makhijani, Daniela Sabán, Kirankumar Shiragur.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1287/opre.2022.2327, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2327. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 21 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.