Journal article · 2001
Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth
Journal of Marketing Research, 38(1), 62–72 · Published 1 February 2001 · DOI 10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826
In brief
“Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth” is a 2001 journal article by Jaideep C Prabhu and David W. Stewart, published in Journal of Marketing Research. OpenAlex counts 194 citations as of 19 November 2026, which puts it in the top 4% of works published in 2001 by citations. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.
- Citations
- 194
- Most cited in
- 2017 (11)
- Field-weighted impact
- 25.55
- References
- 78
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
The authors develop a conceptual framework of how managers interpret competitors' signals over time in various market contexts. From the framework, the authors generate hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of signaling strategies used by firms in different market contexts. The authors conducted two empirical studies involving a repeated entry-pricing game to test the hypotheses. The… Read the full abstract at the publisher.
Excerpt. This paper is not open access.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Prabhu, J. C., & Stewart, D. W. (2001). Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(1), 62–72. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826
MLA 9
Prabhu, Jaideep C, and David W. Stewart. “Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth.” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 38, no. 1, 2001, pp. 62–72. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826.
Chicago
Prabhu, Jaideep C and David W. Stewart. 2001. “Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth.” Journal of Marketing Research 38 (1): 62–72. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826.
Harvard
Prabhu, J. C. and Stewart, D. W. (2001) ‘Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth’, Journal of Marketing Research, 38(1), pp. 62–72. doi:10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826.
IEEE
J. C. Prabhu and D. W. Stewart, “Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth,” Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 62–72, 2001, doi: 10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826.
BibTeX
@article{prabhu2001signaling,
title = {{Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth}},
author = {Prabhu, Jaideep C and Stewart, David W.},
journal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
year = {2001},
volume = {38},
number = {1},
pages = {62--72},
doi = {10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 11 | |
| 2018 | 7 | |
| 2019 | 6 | |
| 2020 | 5 | |
| 2021 | 9 | |
| 2022 | 4 | |
| 2023 | 6 | |
| 2024 | 6 | |
| 2025 | 4 | |
| 2026 | 10 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 25.55: it has been cited 25.55 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- signaling strategies
- competitive interactions
- reputation building
- bluffs
- information concealment
- repeated games
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Prabhu, J. C., & Stewart, D. W. (2001). Signaling Strategies in Competitive Interaction: Building Reputations and Hiding the Truth. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(1), 62–72. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826
How many times has this paper been cited?
194 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.
Who wrote this paper?
Jaideep C Prabhu, David W. Stewart.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.38.1.62.18826. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.