Journal article · 2026 · Open access

Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends

Abdul Ali Khan, Sampsa Rauti, Tuomas Mäkilä

IEEE Access, 14, 134866–134882 · Published 1 January 2026 · DOI 10.1109/access.2026.3727682

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In brief

“Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends” is a 2026 journal article by Abdul Ali Khan and 2 co-authors, published in IEEE Access. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 19 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at IEEE Access.

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Abstract

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineering is changing how code is written, but the security implications for complex systems remain unclear. Previous research has primarily evaluated the security of LLM-generated code on isolated code snippets. However, this narrow scope cannot capture the security risks that emerge in integrated web API backends. To address this, we designed a benchmarking framework derived from a data-driven triangulation of Stack Overflow discussions, GitHub implementations and OWASP security risks. This yielded five representative tasks: Authentication, Role-Based Access Control, File Uploads, Payment Processing and Webhook Handling. We evaluated three state-of-the-art models (GPT-5.2, DeepSeek V3.2 and Gemini 2.5 Pro) using a multi-layered assessment methodology combining static application security testing (SAST), dynamic application security testing (DAST), and manual penetration testing. Scanning the generated APIs for vulnerabilities with SAST tools mainly revealed configuration-level issues. However, upon conducting manual penetration testing, we identified mass assignment exposures, insecure execution ordering, and server-side request forgery vectors. The outputs from the LLMs also pointed towards a disconnect between functional correctness and secure logic. The model that demonstrated high build success (DeepSeek V3.2) produced the most vulnerable code in our trials, introducing severe logic flaws, such as broken object-level authorization (BOLA). On the contrary, the model that struggled most with syntax (Gemini 2.5 Pro) defaulted to safer but less functional implementations. This thesis formally terms this pattern as the human-in-the-loop paradox, in which syntactically sound and well-structured code generated by an LLM may conceal deep architectural vulnerabilities that are not revealed by build success or surface-level inspection. These findings indicate that relying on build success or static analysis alone may create a misleading illusion of correctness. Based on the findings from the literature review and security analysis experiments, the thesis presents recommendations to assist individuals and organizations in utilizing LLM-generated API backends more effectively. We suggest that code produced by current LLMs should not be treated as a trusted draft, but rather as untrusted input from an external system, much like user input in a web form.

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APA 7

Khan, A. A., Rauti, S., & Mäkilä, T. (2026). Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends. IEEE Access, 14, 134866–134882. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682

MLA 9

Khan, Abdul Ali, et al. “Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends.” IEEE Access, vol. 14, 2026, pp. 134866–134882. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682.

Chicago

Khan, Abdul Ali, Sampsa Rauti, and Tuomas Mäkilä. 2026. “Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends.” IEEE Access 14: 134866–134882. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682.

Harvard

Khan, A. A., Rauti, S. and Mäkilä, T. (2026) ‘Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends’, IEEE Access, 14, pp. 134866–134882. doi:10.1109/access.2026.3727682.

IEEE

A. A. Khan, S. Rauti, and T. Mäkilä, “Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends,” IEEE Access, vol. 14, pp. 134866–134882, 2026, doi: 10.1109/access.2026.3727682.

BibTeX

@article{khan2026security,
  title     = {{Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends}},
  author    = {Khan, Abdul Ali and Rauti, Sampsa and Mäkilä, Tuomas},
  journal   = {IEEE Access},
  year      = {2026},
  volume    = {14},
  pages     = {134866--134882},
  doi       = {10.1109/access.2026.3727682},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682}
}

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Topic and keywords

Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities

  • LLM-generated code
  • software security
  • authentication vulnerabilities
  • role-based access control
  • server-side request forgery
  • mass assignment
  • webhooks
  • penetration testing

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Khan, A. A., Rauti, S., & Mäkilä, T. (2026). Security Analysis of LLM-Generated Web API Backends. IEEE Access, 14, 134866–134882. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682

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Who wrote this paper?

Abdul Ali Khan, Sampsa Rauti, Tuomas Mäkilä.

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10.1109/access.2026.3727682, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2026.3727682. Sign in and open it from this page.

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