Journal article · 2020 · Open access

Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Abhijit Banerjee, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, Michael F. Walton

American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353 · Published 1 January 2020 · DOI 10.1257/app.20220088

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In brief

“Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections” is a 2020 journal article by Abhijit Banerjee and 3 co-authors, published in American Economic Journal Applied Economics. OpenAlex counts 16 citations as of 19 November 2026, which puts it in the top 8% of works published in 2020 by citations. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.

Citations
16
Most cited in
2025 (6)
Field-weighted impact
0.94
References
30
Authors
4

Abstract

Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors’ high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. (JEL D72, D83, H75, J16, O15, O17, O18)

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R., & Walton, M. F. (2020). Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088

MLA 9

Banerjee, Abhijit, et al. “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections.” American Economic Journal Applied Economics, vol. 16, no. 3, 2020, pp. 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088.

Chicago

Banerjee, Abhijit, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, and Michael F. Walton. 2020. “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections.” American Economic Journal Applied Economics 16 (3): 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088.

Harvard

Banerjee, A. et al. (2020) ‘Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections’, American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), pp. 323–353. doi:10.1257/app.20220088.

IEEE

A. Banerjee, N. Enevoldsen, R. Pande, and M. F. Walton, “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections,” American Economic Journal Applied Economics, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 323–353, 2020, doi: 10.1257/app.20220088.

BibTeX

@article{banerjee2020public,
  title     = {{Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections}},
  author    = {Banerjee, Abhijit and Enevoldsen, Nils and Pande, Rohini and Walton, Michael F.},
  journal   = {American Economic Journal Applied Economics},
  year      = {2020},
  volume    = {16},
  number    = {3},
  pages     = {323--353},
  doi       = {10.1257/app.20220088},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088}
}

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Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
202222
202433
202566
202655

Its field-weighted citation impact is 0.94: it has been cited 0.94 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation

  • public information
  • political accountability
  • slum areas
  • municipal councillors
  • gender quotas
  • electoral incentives
  • political parties
  • local government

Work with this paper

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R., & Walton, M. F. (2020). Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088

How many times has this paper been cited?

16 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Abhijit Banerjee, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, Michael F. Walton.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1257/app.20220088, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.