Journal article · 2020 · Open access
Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353 · Published 1 January 2020 · DOI 10.1257/app.20220088
In brief
“Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections” is a 2020 journal article by Abhijit Banerjee and 3 co-authors, published in American Economic Journal Applied Economics. OpenAlex counts 16 citations as of 19 November 2026, which puts it in the top 8% of works published in 2020 by citations. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Citations
- 16
- Most cited in
- 2025 (6)
- Field-weighted impact
- 0.94
- References
- 30
- Authors
- 4
Abstract
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors’ high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. (JEL D72, D83, H75, J16, O15, O17, O18)
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R., & Walton, M. F. (2020). Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088
MLA 9
Banerjee, Abhijit, et al. “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections.” American Economic Journal Applied Economics, vol. 16, no. 3, 2020, pp. 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088.
Chicago
Banerjee, Abhijit, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, and Michael F. Walton. 2020. “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections.” American Economic Journal Applied Economics 16 (3): 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088.
Harvard
Banerjee, A. et al. (2020) ‘Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections’, American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), pp. 323–353. doi:10.1257/app.20220088.
IEEE
A. Banerjee, N. Enevoldsen, R. Pande, and M. F. Walton, “Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections,” American Economic Journal Applied Economics, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 323–353, 2020, doi: 10.1257/app.20220088.
BibTeX
@article{banerjee2020public,
title = {{Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections}},
author = {Banerjee, Abhijit and Enevoldsen, Nils and Pande, Rohini and Walton, Michael F.},
journal = {American Economic Journal Applied Economics},
year = {2020},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {323--353},
doi = {10.1257/app.20220088},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 2 | |
| 2024 | 3 | |
| 2025 | 6 | |
| 2026 | 5 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 0.94: it has been cited 0.94 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- public information
- political accountability
- slum areas
- municipal councillors
- gender quotas
- electoral incentives
- political parties
- local government
Work with this paper
Most-cited papers in Social Sciences
- Using thematic analysis in psychologyVirginia Braun, Victoria Clarke · Qualitative Research in Psychology · 2006 · 240,222 citations
- Case Study Research: Design and MethodsRobert K. Yin · 1984 · 81,951 citations
- Three Approaches to Qualitative Content AnalysisHsiu-Fang Hsieh, Sarah Elizabeth Shannon · Qualitative Health Research · 2005 · 49,623 citations
- Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded SourcebookMatthew B. Miles, A Michael Huberman · Journal of Environmental Psychology · 1994 · 48,311 citations
- Consolidated criteria for reporting qualitative research (COREQ): a 32-item checklist for interviews and focus groupsAllison Tong, Peter Sainsbury, Jonathan C. Craig · International Journal for Quality in Health Care · 2007 · 45,353 citations
Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Banerjee, A., Enevoldsen, N., Pande, R., & Walton, M. F. (2020). Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections. American Economic Journal Applied Economics, 16(3), 323–353. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088
How many times has this paper been cited?
16 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Abhijit Banerjee, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, Michael F. Walton.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1257/app.20220088, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220088. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.