Journal article · 2021 · Open access
Private contracts in two‐sided platforms
The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(4), 815–838 · Published 1 December 2021 · DOI 10.1111/1756-2171.12392
In brief
“Private contracts in two‐sided platforms” is a 2021 journal article by Gastón Llanes and Francisco Ruiz‐Aliseda, published in The RAND Journal of Economics. OpenAlex counts 10 citations as of 18 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at RePEc: Research Papers in Economics.
- Citations
- 10
- Most cited in
- 2022 (3)
- Field-weighted impact
- 0.67
- References
- 30
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold‐up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers' prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to not behaving opportunistically, which increases profits and welfare. Thus, policy prescriptions for dealing with contractual secrecy are reversed in the case of two‐sided platforms. We also find a platform may benefit from an erosion of its market power on one side of the market because this erosion may raise the surplus it offers the other side.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Llanes, G., & Ruiz‐Aliseda, F. (2021). Private contracts in two‐sided platforms. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(4), 815–838. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392
MLA 9
Llanes, Gastón, and Francisco Ruiz‐Aliseda. “Private contracts in two‐sided platforms.” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 52, no. 4, 2021, pp. 815–838. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392.
Chicago
Llanes, Gastón and Francisco Ruiz‐Aliseda. 2021. “Private contracts in two‐sided platforms.” The RAND Journal of Economics 52 (4): 815–838. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392.
Harvard
Llanes, G. and Ruiz‐Aliseda, F. (2021) ‘Private contracts in two‐sided platforms’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(4), pp. 815–838. doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12392.
IEEE
G. Llanes and F. Ruiz‐Aliseda, “Private contracts in two‐sided platforms,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 815–838, 2021, doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12392.
BibTeX
@article{llanes2021private,
title = {{Private contracts in two‐sided platforms}},
author = {Llanes, Gastón and Ruiz‐Aliseda, Francisco},
journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
year = {2021},
volume = {52},
number = {4},
pages = {815--838},
doi = {10.1111/1756-2171.12392},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 1 | |
| 2017 | 2 | |
| 2020 | 1 | |
| 2022 | 3 | |
| 2023 | 1 | |
| 2025 | 2 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 0.67: it has been cited 0.67 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- two-sided markets
- private contracts
- hold-up problem
- price transparency
- opportunism
- platform profit
- welfare
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Llanes, G., & Ruiz‐Aliseda, F. (2021). Private contracts in two‐sided platforms. The RAND Journal of Economics, 52(4), 815–838. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392
How many times has this paper been cited?
10 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at RePEc: Research Papers in Economics: sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Gastón Llanes, Francisco Ruiz‐Aliseda.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1111/1756-2171.12392, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12392. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 18 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.