Journal article · 2026 · Open access
Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition
Strategic Management Journal · Published 22 October 2026 · DOI 10.1002/smj.70133
In brief
“Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition” is a 2026 journal article by Alessandro Iorio and 2 co-authors, published in Strategic Management Journal. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 17 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at Strategic Management Journal.
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Abstract
Research Summary We introduce the concept of pay‐for‐prominence , a system where employees are monetarily incentivized to become knowledge hubs in the intrafirm network and examine its effects on employees' networks and attrition. Integrating social network theory with relational incentives theory, we argue that pay‐for‐prominence motivates strategic networking behaviors that lead to the emergence of prominent connectors. However, these changes are associated with higher attrition as employees are preoccupied with networking, thus suggesting a trade‐off between enhanced connectivity in the short term and the risk of network fragmentation in the long term. Using a field quasi‐experiment in a multinational firm, we show that organizations can successfully incentivize employees' network prominence, but doing so may produce unintended consequences. Managerial Summary We examine the impact of using monetary incentives to encourage employees to become knowledge hubs in the workplace informal network—a term we label pay‐for‐prominence. We find that offering monetary rewards based on network metrics encourages employees to broaden their connections, enhancing knowledge flows within the firm. However, employees who become more socially prominent experience higher attrition than those who do not, as they become preoccupied with networking. Therefore, while incentivizing networking can improve knowledge sharing, it also requires careful management to avoid unintended consequences, such as the exit of key players that could cause fragmentation of the social network. Managers should weigh the benefits of increased connectivity against the risks of fragmentation when designing incentive programs aimed at fostering informal networks.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Iorio, A., Soda, G., & Aven, B. L. (2026). Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition. Strategic Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133
MLA 9
Iorio, Alessandro, et al. “Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition.” Strategic Management Journal, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133.
Chicago
Iorio, Alessandro, Giuseppe Soda, and Brandy L. Aven. 2026. “Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition.” Strategic Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133.
Harvard
Iorio, A., Soda, G. and Aven, B. L. (2026) ‘Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition’, Strategic Management Journal. doi:10.1002/smj.70133.
IEEE
A. Iorio, G. Soda, and B. L. Aven, “Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition,” Strategic Management Journal, 2026, doi: 10.1002/smj.70133.
BibTeX
@article{iorio2026prominence,
title = {{Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition}},
author = {Iorio, Alessandro and Soda, Giuseppe and Aven, Brandy L.},
journal = {Strategic Management Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1002/smj.70133},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Knowledge Management and Sharing
- financial incentives
- employee networks
- employee attrition
- knowledge hub
- knowledge sharing
- network fragmentation
- strategic networking
- incentive design
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Iorio, A., Soda, G., & Aven, B. L. (2026). Pay‐for‐prominence: The (un)intended consequences of monetary incentives on employees' networks and attrition. Strategic Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133
How many times has this paper been cited?
0 times, according to OpenAlex on 17 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at Strategic Management Journal: sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Alessandro Iorio, Giuseppe Soda, Brandy L. Aven.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1002/smj.70133, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.70133. Sign in and open it from this page.
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