Preprint · 1999 · Open access
Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt
SSRN Electronic Journal · Published 1 January 1999 · DOI 10.2139/ssrn.190497
In brief
“Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt” is a 1999 preprint by Holger M. Mueller and Roman Inderst, published in SSRN Electronic Journal. OpenAlex counts 29 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Citations
- 29
- Most cited in
- 2013 (3)
- References
- 3
- Authors
- 2
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Mueller, H. M., & Inderst, R. (1999). Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497
MLA 9
Mueller, Holger M., and Roman Inderst. “Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497.
Chicago
Mueller, Holger M. and Roman Inderst. 1999. “Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt.” SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497.
Harvard
Mueller, H. M. and Inderst, R. (1999) ‘Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt’, SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.190497.
IEEE
H. M. Mueller and R. Inderst, “Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.190497.
BibTeX
@misc{mueller1999ownership,
title = {{Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt}},
author = {Mueller, Holger M. and Inderst, Roman},
howpublished = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
year = {1999},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.190497},
url = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 2 | |
| 2013 | 3 | |
| 2015 | 1 | |
| 2016 | 2 | |
| 2019 | 2 | |
| 2020 | 1 | |
| 2024 | 1 | |
| 2025 | 1 |
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- ownership concentration
- agency costs of debt
- monitoring
- managerial overconfidence
- risk-taking
- dispersed ownership
- commitment
- delegation
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Mueller, H. M., & Inderst, R. (1999). Ownership Concentration, Monitoring, and the Agency Cost of Debt. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497
How many times has this paper been cited?
29 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at SSRN Electronic Journal.
Who wrote this paper?
Holger M. Mueller, Roman Inderst.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.2139/ssrn.190497. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.190497.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.