Journal article · 2026 · Open access
Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · Published 31 August 2026 · DOI 10.1287/msom.2024.1389
In brief
“Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion” is a 2026 journal article by Julius Durmann and 2 co-authors, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. OpenAlex counts 9 citations as of 16 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at arXiv (Cornell University).
- Citations
- 9
- Most cited in
- 2026 (5)
- Field-weighted impact
- 21.32
- References
- 73
- Authors
- 3
Abstract
Problem definition: This paper examines whether widely used online learning algorithms used in pricing can independently reach competitive outcomes or whether they may instead foster tacit collusion. This issue has drawn considerable attention from competition regulators, because algorithmic pricing is increasingly common in digital markets. Understanding when such algorithms lead to equilibrium prices or to supra-competitive prices is critical for buyers, sellers, and policymakers. Methodology/results: We study the behavior of multiarmed bandit algorithms in repeated price competition. These algorithms only observe profits from the prices actually chosen, making them realistic models of automated pricing. Using formal analysis, we show that an important class of online learning algorithms, called mean-based algorithms, reliably converges to the Nash equilibrium in Bertrand competition. This finding is notable because, in general, online learning algorithms do not guarantee convergence to equilibrium. In addition, we run extensive numerical experiments with different widely used bandit algorithms. The experiments confirm that most of them, including those that are not mean based, also converge to equilibrium. We observe supra-competitive prices only in special cases where all sellers implement the same symmetric version of certain algorithms, such as upper confidence bound. Even then, supra-competitive pricing vanishes as the number of competing sellers increases. Managerial implications: Our results highlight that the risk of algorithmic collusion in competitive pricing markets is often overstated. For most practical implementations of bandit algorithms, sellers’ prices converge to competitive levels. Only under very specific and symmetric setups do prices remain above competitive benchmarks, and this effect diminishes with more competitors. These insights provide reassurance to regulators concerned with consumer welfare, as well as to managers considering algorithmic pricing tools. They suggest that, although vigilance is warranted, fears of widespread algorithm-driven collusion may be exaggerated. Funding: This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme [Grant agreement 101198689]. This project was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) - GRK 2201/2 - Project Number 277991500. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389 .
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Durmann, J., Oberlechner, M., & Bichler, M. (2026). Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389
MLA 9
Durmann, Julius, et al. “Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389.
Chicago
Durmann, Julius, Matthias Oberlechner, and Martin Bichler. 2026. “Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389.
Harvard
Durmann, J., Oberlechner, M. and Bichler, M. (2026) ‘Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. doi:10.1287/msom.2024.1389.
IEEE
J. Durmann, M. Oberlechner, and M. Bichler, “Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2026, doi: 10.1287/msom.2024.1389.
BibTeX
@article{durmann2026online,
title = {{Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion}},
author = {Durmann, Julius and Oberlechner, Matthias and Bichler, Martin},
journal = {Manufacturing \& Service Operations Management},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1287/msom.2024.1389},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 1 | |
| 2025 | 3 | |
| 2026 | 5 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 21.32: it has been cited 21.32 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- algorithmic collusion
- online learning algorithms
- multi-armed bandits
- Bertrand competition
- Nash equilibrium convergence
- upper confidence bound
- algorithmic pricing
- digital markets
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Durmann, J., Oberlechner, M., & Bichler, M. (2026). Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389
How many times has this paper been cited?
9 times, according to OpenAlex on 16 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at arXiv (Cornell University): sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Julius Durmann, Matthias Oberlechner, Martin Bichler.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1287/msom.2024.1389, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1389. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 16 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.