Journal article · 2026 · Open access

Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information

Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii

Econometrica, 94(1), 35–70 · Published 1 January 2026 · DOI 10.3982/ecta23622

Open PDFView at the publisherCite this paper

In brief

“Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information” is a 2026 journal article by Mira Frick and 2 co-authors, published in Econometrica. OpenAlex counts 11 citations as of 18 November 2026, which puts it in the top 8% of works published in 2026 by citations. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at Econometrica.

Citations
11
Most cited in
2026 (7)
Field-weighted impact
16.97
References
48
Authors
3

Abstract

A multi‐product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for the goods. As is well known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple mechanisms—such as pure bundling or separate sales—can be far from optimal and do not admit clear‐cut comparisons. We show that this changes if the monopolist has sufficiently precise information about the buyer's valuations: Now, pure bundling always outperforms separate sales; moreover, there is a sense in which pure bundling performs essentially as well as the optimal mechanism. To formalize this, we characterize how fast the corresponding revenues converge to the first‐best revenue as the monopolist's information grows precise: Pure bundling achieves the same convergence rate to the first‐best as optimal mechanisms; in contrast, the convergence rate under separate sales is suboptimal.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Frick, M., Iijima, R., & Ishii, Y. (2026). Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information. Econometrica, 94(1), 35–70. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622

MLA 9

Frick, Mira, et al. “Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information.” Econometrica, vol. 94, no. 1, 2026, pp. 35–70. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622.

Chicago

Frick, Mira, Ryota Iijima, and Yuhta Ishii. 2026. “Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information.” Econometrica 94 (1): 35–70. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622.

Harvard

Frick, M., Iijima, R. and Ishii, Y. (2026) ‘Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information’, Econometrica, 94(1), pp. 35–70. doi:10.3982/ecta23622.

IEEE

M. Frick, R. Iijima, and Y. Ishii, “Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information,” Econometrica, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 35–70, 2026, doi: 10.3982/ecta23622.

BibTeX

@article{frick2026multidimensional,
  title     = {{Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information}},
  author    = {Frick, Mira and Iijima, Ryota and Ishii, Yuhta},
  journal   = {Econometrica},
  year      = {2026},
  volume    = {94},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {35--70},
  doi       = {10.3982/ecta23622},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622}
}

Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)

Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
202422
202522
202677

Its field-weighted citation impact is 16.97: it has been cited 16.97 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications

  • multidimensional screening
  • private information
  • bundling
  • optimal mechanisms
  • information precision
  • mechanism design

Work with this paper

Most-cited papers in Decision Sciences

All highly cited Decision Sciences papers

Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Frick, M., Iijima, R., & Ishii, Y. (2026). Multidimensional Screening With Precise Seller Information. Econometrica, 94(1), 35–70. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622

How many times has this paper been cited?

11 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at Econometrica: sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima, Yuhta Ishii.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.3982/ecta23622, permanently at https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta23622. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 18 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.