Journal article · 2026 · Open access
More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation
Management Science · Published 1 October 2026 · DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553
In brief
“More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation” is a 2026 journal article by Claudine Madras Gartenberg and Elaine Seoyoung Pak, published in Management Science. OpenAlex counts 1 citations as of 17 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Citations
- 1
- Most cited in
- 2023 (1)
- References
- 103
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
The rise of active owners—hedge funds and private equity firms—has raised questions about the influence of corporate owners on employee compensation. Prior research documents that active owners reduce overall compensation through workforce restructuring and slower wage growth. What remains unexplored is whether active owners also pay less for comparable work: whether they compensate the same jobs differently than other owners. Using detailed compensation from more than 20 million employee records across 896 U.S. firms, we compare pay within narrowly defined labor markets that hold constant year, region, occupation, and skill level. We find that firms with active owners pay 2%–4% less for comparable work than other firms. These differentials manifest as both lower base salary and flatter incentive pay and appear to reflect, at least in part, an owner treatment effect. Notably, the effects are concentrated in more monitorable contexts, including routine jobs, jobs with quantifiable outputs, and those in less knowledge-intensive industries. These patterns are consistent with active owners substituting compensation-based incentives with managerial oversight, particularly in quantifiable and routine settings. This suggests that, as work becomes more measurable, firm ownership may play a greater role in shaping employee outcomes. This paper was accepted by Isabel Fernandez-Mateo, organizations. Funding: C. Gartenberg and E. Pak recognize the generous financial support from the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553 .
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Gartenberg, C. M., & Pak, E. S. (2026). More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553
MLA 9
Gartenberg, Claudine Madras, and Elaine Seoyoung Pak. “More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation.” Management Science, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553.
Chicago
Gartenberg, Claudine Madras and Elaine Seoyoung Pak. 2026. “More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation.” Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553.
Harvard
Gartenberg, C. M. and Pak, E. S. (2026) ‘More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation’, Management Science. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553.
IEEE
C. M. Gartenberg and E. S. Pak, “More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation,” Management Science, 2026, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553.
BibTeX
@article{gartenberg2026more,
title = {{More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation}},
author = {Gartenberg, Claudine Madras and Pak, Elaine Seoyoung},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- active ownership
- employee compensation
- hedge funds
- private equity
- corporate governance
- monitoring
- wage differentials
- performance-based pay
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Gartenberg, C. M., & Pak, E. S. (2026). More Monitoring, Less Pay: Active Ownership and Employee Compensation. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553
How many times has this paper been cited?
1 times, according to OpenAlex on 17 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Claudine Madras Gartenberg, Elaine Seoyoung Pak.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08553. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 17 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.