Journal article · 2016 · Open access

Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality

Carlos Fernández, Rubén Arrondo García, Shams Pathan

Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 46(1), 28–62 · Published 30 November 2016 · DOI 10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345

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In brief

“Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality” is a 2016 journal article by Carlos Fernández and 2 co-authors, published in Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad. OpenAlex counts 49 citations as of 21 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.

Citations
49
Most cited in
2023 (12)
Field-weighted impact
4.08
References
66
Authors
3

Abstract

We examine the influence of multiple board directorships and boards’ committee memberships on three board supervisory outcomes: executive remuneration, external auditor opinion, and earnings management. The study uses a panel of 122 non-financial companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange over the period 2004–2011. Our results show that firms with busy directors offer low executive remuneration and present a low probability of a qualified audit opinion. Furthermore, the results indicate that firms with overlap directors exhibit a higher probability of receiving a qualified audit opinion. Additionally, we find evidence that the overcommitment effects of busy and overlap directors are more evident for large firms. Overall, our findings suggest that busy (overlap) directors are beneficial (detrimental) to the monitoring capability of the board in the Spanish context.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Fernández, C., García, R. A., & Pathan, S. (2016). Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 46(1), 28–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345

MLA 9

Fernández, Carlos, et al. “Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality.” Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, vol. 46, no. 1, 2016, pp. 28–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345.

Chicago

Fernández, Carlos, Rubén Arrondo García, and Shams Pathan. 2016. “Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality.” Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad 46 (1): 28–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345.

Harvard

Fernández, C., García, R. A. and Pathan, S. (2016) ‘Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality’, Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 46(1), pp. 28–62. doi:10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345.

IEEE

C. Fernández, R. A. García, and S. Pathan, “Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality,” Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 28–62, 2016, doi: 10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345.

BibTeX

@article{fernandez2016monitoring,
  title     = {{Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality}},
  author    = {Fernández, Carlos and García, Rubén Arrondo and Pathan, Shams},
  journal   = {Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad},
  year      = {2016},
  volume    = {46},
  number    = {1},
  pages     = {28--62},
  doi       = {10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345}
}

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Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
201733
201844
201944
202033
202155
202233
20231212
202499
202511
202655

Its field-weighted citation impact is 4.08: it has been cited 4.08 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • busy directors
  • board oversight
  • executive compensation
  • financial reporting quality
  • audit opinion
  • qualified audit opinion
  • earnings management
  • board committees

Work with this paper

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Fernández, C., García, R. A., & Pathan, S. (2016). Monitoring by busy and overlap directors: an examination of executive remuneration and financial reporting quality. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 46(1), 28–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345

How many times has this paper been cited?

49 times, according to OpenAlex on 21 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Carlos Fernández, Rubén Arrondo García, Shams Pathan.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2016.1250345. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 21 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.