Journal article · 2021 · Open access
Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy
BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, 18(1) · Published 1 January 2021 · DOI 10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112
In brief
“Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy” is a 2021 journal article by Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza and 3 co-authors, published in BAR - Brazilian Administration Review. OpenAlex counts 14 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at BAR - Brazilian Administration Review.
- Citations
- 14
- Most cited in
- 2025 (4)
- Field-weighted impact
- 1.37
- References
- 64
- Authors
- 4
Abstract
We analyzed the effect of managerial ownership, leverage, and managerial discretion on the agency costs of 14,719 Chilean companies. The results of the instrumental variables (IV) regressions indicate that managerial ownership and capital structure have a negative and non-linear effect on agency costs. Managerial ownership concentration is an effective means of internal control over agency costs, discarding the managerial entrenchment effect. The non-linear impact of debt suggests that for high leverage levels, agency costs would increase due to higher bankruptcy costs. Managerial discretion reduces agency costs; however, in firms with low growth opportunities, it increases them. These results have relevant implications for firms’ corporate policy and investors.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Mendoza, J. A. M., Yelpo, S. M. S., Ramos, C. L. V., & Fuentealba, C. L. D. (2021). Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, 18(1). https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112
MLA 9
Mendoza, Jorge Andrés Muñoz, et al. “Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy.” BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, vol. 18, no. 1, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112.
Chicago
Mendoza, Jorge Andrés Muñoz, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo, Carmen L. Veloso Ramos, and Carlos Leandro Delgado Fuentealba. 2021. “Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy.” BAR - Brazilian Administration Review 18 (1). https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112.
Harvard
Mendoza, J. A. M. et al. (2021) ‘Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy’, BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, 18(1). doi:10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112.
IEEE
J. A. M. Mendoza, S. M. S. Yelpo, C. L. V. Ramos, and C. L. D. Fuentealba, “Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy,” BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, vol. 18, no. 1, 2021, doi: 10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112.
BibTeX
@article{mendoza2021monitoring,
title = {{Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy}},
author = {Mendoza, Jorge Andrés Muñoz and Yelpo, Sandra María Sepúlveda and Ramos, Carmen L. Veloso and Fuentealba, Carlos Leandro Delgado},
journal = {BAR - Brazilian Administration Review},
year = {2021},
volume = {18},
number = {1},
doi = {10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 1 | |
| 2023 | 3 | |
| 2024 | 3 | |
| 2025 | 4 | |
| 2026 | 3 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 1.37: it has been cited 1.37 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- agency costs
- managerial ownership
- managerial discretion
- monitoring
- leverage
- capital structure
- bankruptcy costs
- managerial entrenchment
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Mendoza, J. A. M., Yelpo, S. M. S., Ramos, C. L. V., & Fuentealba, C. L. D. (2021). Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy. BAR - Brazilian Administration Review, 18(1). https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112
How many times has this paper been cited?
14 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at BAR - Brazilian Administration Review.
Who wrote this paper?
Jorge Andrés Muñoz Mendoza, Sandra María Sepúlveda Yelpo, Carmen L. Veloso Ramos, Carlos Leandro Delgado Fuentealba.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-7692bar2021190112.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.