Journal article · 2026 · Open access

Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents

Paola Martin, Owen Q. Wu, Larysa Yakymova

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · Published 21 October 2026 · DOI 10.1287/msom.2026.0298

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In brief

“Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents” is a 2026 journal article by Paola Martin and 2 co-authors, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 17 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.

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Abstract

Problem Definition: In many crisis contexts, such as armed conflicts, natural disasters, or refugee emergencies, one of the most pressing challenges is to regulate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the final beneficiaries in the presence of both corruptible agents (those responsible for delivering aid) and corruptible inspectors (who may be bribed not to report uncovered misappropriations). Strengthening anti-corruption efforts by hiring more inspectors and/or rewarding inspectors’ truthful reporting can reduce corruption but draws on the finite humanitarian aid financing, reducing the aid delivered to the beneficiaries. Methodology/Results: We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model in which a government agency chooses inspection intensity and the reward rate for inspectors’ truthful reporting, managers decide how much aid to misappropriate, and inspectors decide whether to report detected misconduct or accept a bribe to conceal misappropriation. The government agency aims to maximize the amount of humanitarian aid reaching the beneficiaries. We find that the role of inspectors depends on the financing available. When the financing is low, inspectors serve to detect misconduct; when the financing is sufficiently high, inspectors also affect managers' behavior and deter misappropriation. The reward can also serve two purposes. It can either induce truthful reporting and eliminate bribery, or increase the bribe that managers must pay, thereby reducing their incentive to misappropriate. We characterize the impact of key parameters on the optimal anti-corruption levers. Managerial Implications: Our results provide guidance for agencies and donors on how to balance aid provision with anti-corruption measures, and how to adjust inspection intensity and incentive for truthful reporting to maximize the amount of aid reaching its intended recipients. As financing changes, resources should be allocated toward adjusting inspection intensity. In contrast, the reward rate for truthful reporting should be calibrated to the enforcement environment, and not be mechanically increased with the amount of financing.

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APA 7

Martin, P., Wu, O. Q., & Yakymova, L. (2026). Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298

MLA 9

Martin, Paola, et al. “Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298.

Chicago

Martin, Paola, Owen Q. Wu, and Larysa Yakymova. 2026. “Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298.

Harvard

Martin, P., Wu, O. Q. and Yakymova, L. (2026) ‘Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. doi:10.1287/msom.2026.0298.

IEEE

P. Martin, O. Q. Wu, and L. Yakymova, “Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2026, doi: 10.1287/msom.2026.0298.

BibTeX

@article{martin2026humanitarian,
  title     = {{Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents}},
  author    = {Martin, Paola and Wu, Owen Q. and Yakymova, Larysa},
  journal   = {Manufacturing \& Service Operations Management},
  year      = {2026},
  doi       = {10.1287/msom.2026.0298},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development

  • humanitarian aid
  • corruption
  • bribery
  • anti-corruption measures
  • aid financing
  • game-theoretic model
  • crisis management

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Martin, P., Wu, O. Q., & Yakymova, L. (2026). Humanitarian Aid Management under Corruptible Distribution and Oversight Agents. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 17 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Paola Martin, Owen Q. Wu, Larysa Yakymova.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1287/msom.2026.0298, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2026.0298. Sign in and open it from this page.

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