Journal article · 2019

How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay

Ian Cherry, Vladimir A. Gatchev

Financial Review, 54(3), 501–540 · Published 10 January 2019 · DOI 10.1111/fire.12190

View at the publisherCite this paper

In brief

“How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay” is a 2019 journal article by Ian Cherry and Vladimir A. Gatchev, published in Financial Review. OpenAlex counts 4 citations as of 21 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.

Citations
4
Most cited in
2026 (2)
Field-weighted impact
0.25
References
83
Authors
2

Abstract

We examine how firms use the network of overlapping directorships to determine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We contribute to related work by empirically exploring two competing hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, networks propagate relevant information used to establish good pay practices. In the second hypothesis, director networks are used opportunistically to benefit the CEO.… Read the full abstract at the publisher.

Excerpt. This paper is not open access.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Cherry, I., & Gatchev, V. A. (2019). How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay. Financial Review, 54(3), 501–540. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190

MLA 9

Cherry, Ian, and Vladimir A. Gatchev. “How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay.” Financial Review, vol. 54, no. 3, 2019, pp. 501–540. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190.

Chicago

Cherry, Ian and Vladimir A. Gatchev. 2019. “How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay.” Financial Review 54 (3): 501–540. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190.

Harvard

Cherry, I. and Gatchev, V. A. (2019) ‘How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay’, Financial Review, 54(3), pp. 501–540. doi:10.1111/fire.12190.

IEEE

I. Cherry and V. A. Gatchev, “How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay,” Financial Review, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 501–540, 2019, doi: 10.1111/fire.12190.

BibTeX

@article{cherry2019firms,
  title     = {{How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay}},
  author    = {Cherry, Ian and Gatchev, Vladimir A.},
  journal   = {Financial Review},
  year      = {2019},
  volume    = {54},
  number    = {3},
  pages     = {501--540},
  doi       = {10.1111/fire.12190},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190}
}

Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)

Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
202011
202511
202622

Its field-weighted citation impact is 0.25: it has been cited 0.25 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • CEO compensation
  • director networks
  • board of directors
  • executive compensation
  • information dissemination
  • opportunism
  • CEO entrenchment
  • compensation consultants

Work with this paper

Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance

All highly cited Economics, Econometrics and Finance papers

Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Cherry, I., & Gatchev, V. A. (2019). How Firms Use Director Networks in Setting CEO Pay. Financial Review, 54(3), 501–540. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190

How many times has this paper been cited?

4 times, according to OpenAlex on 21 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.

Who wrote this paper?

Ian Cherry, Vladimir A. Gatchev.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1111/fire.12190, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12190. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 21 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.