Journal article · 2005 · Open access
How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?
Corporate Governance An International Review, 13(4), 505–516 · Published 29 June 2005 · DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x
In brief
“How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?” is a 2005 journal article by Alberto Miguel and 2 co-authors, published in Corporate Governance An International Review. OpenAlex counts 99 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Citations
- 99
- Most cited in
- 2016 (8)
- Field-weighted impact
- 5.43
- References
- 80
- Authors
- 3
Abstract
This paper examines how different control mechanisms relate to one another in the Spanish corporate governance system. We propose a new empirical approach that consists of analysing control mechanisms according to the non‐linearity of the value‐ownership relation, and emphasising entrenchment and expropriation phenomena. Our evidence contributes to understanding the role played by several control mechanisms in the Spanish corporate governance system, which largely differs from the US one. Our results show that control mechanisms (especially insider ownership, debt and dividends) are used in a complementary way by Spanish firms. Additionally, this complementarity is only observed when the interests of managers and owners converge, but not when there are controlling owners whose interests need not coincide with those of minority shareholders. Therefore, entrenchment and expropriation effects do influence the relationship among control mechanisms.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Miguel, A., Pindado, J., & de la Torre, C. (2005). How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms? Corporate Governance An International Review, 13(4), 505–516. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x
MLA 9
Miguel, Alberto, et al. “How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?” Corporate Governance An International Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2005, pp. 505–516. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x.
Chicago
Miguel, Alberto, Julio Pindado, and Chabela de la Torre. 2005. “How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?” Corporate Governance An International Review 13 (4): 505–516. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x.
Harvard
Miguel, A., Pindado, J. and de la Torre, C. (2005) ‘How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?’, Corporate Governance An International Review, 13(4), pp. 505–516. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x.
IEEE
A. Miguel, J. Pindado, and C. de la Torre, “How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?,” Corporate Governance An International Review, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 505–516, 2005, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x.
BibTeX
@article{miguel2005entrenchment,
title = {{How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms?}},
author = {Miguel, Alberto and Pindado, Julio and de la Torre, Chabela},
journal = {Corporate Governance An International Review},
year = {2005},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
pages = {505--516},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x}
}
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Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 8 | |
| 2017 | 5 | |
| 2018 | 5 | |
| 2019 | 7 | |
| 2020 | 5 | |
| 2021 | 4 | |
| 2023 | 3 | |
| 2024 | 1 | |
| 2025 | 3 | |
| 2026 | 1 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 5.43: it has been cited 5.43 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- corporate control mechanisms
- entrenchment
- expropriation
- managerial ownership
- debt financing
- dividends
- minority shareholders
- controlling shareholders
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Miguel, A., Pindado, J., & de la Torre, C. (2005). How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms? Corporate Governance An International Review, 13(4), 505–516. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x
How many times has this paper been cited?
99 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at SSRN Electronic Journal.
Who wrote this paper?
Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00445.x.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.