Paper · 2020 · Open access

Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory

Jaja Suteja

Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan) · Published 1 January 2020 · DOI 10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406

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In brief

“Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory” is a 2020 paper by Jaja Suteja, published in Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan). OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 19 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan).

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Abstract

In running the company operations, oftenly the actions of the managers, instead of maximizing the welfare \nof the owners (stockholders) as the main purpose of the company exists or is established, but rather tend \nto increase their own welfare. The decisions they make tend to benefit the insiders, for example expanding \nto improve the status and salary, as well as imposing costs on companies. These conditions will result in the \nemergence of a wide degree of difference of interests between stockholders and the insider. The conflict \ncaused by the separation between ownership and control functions in financial theory called agency conflict. \nAgency theory suggests a number of mechanisms that can be used to oversee the agency conflict, \nincluding an increase in insider ownership and debt financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) says that the use \nof instruments of insider ownership is able to align the interests of managers and other stockholders, this \npolicy led to increased managerial control of the parties. Meanwhile, according to Grossman and Hart \n(1982), agency problems can be reduced by using debt policy instruments, the use of this instrument \nwould be binding on the company in a “contract” with debtholders, the company burdened with the \nobligation to make interest payments and principal repayments on a periodic basis. \nThe increased percentage of insider would increase the risk of non-diversifiable debt (Friend, et al. \n1988; Bathala, et al. 1994). They say that a high percentage of insider would be pushed to choose risky \nprojects in the hope to gain higher profits. To finance the project, insider choose financing through debt, in \nthe hope they can divert the underwriting risk to the creditor if the project fails. On the other hand, if the \ninvestment project is successful, stockholders will receive the results of the residue because creditors will \nonly be paid for certain, namely in the form of flowers. However, the use of debt is too high which can \nincrease the risk of bankruptcy (Banckruptcy risk) and financial difficulties (financial distress). \nIn order to overcome the disadvantages of the emergence of the use of debt and the percentage of \ntoo large insider, it takes a control of mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990).

Cite this paper

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APA 7

Suteja, J. (2020). Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory. Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan). https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406

MLA 9

Suteja, Jaja. “Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory.” Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan), 2020. https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406.

Chicago

Suteja, Jaja. 2020. “Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory.” Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan). https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406.

Harvard

Suteja, J. (2020) ‘Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory’, Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan). doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406.

IEEE

J. Suteja, “Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory,” Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan), 2020, doi: 10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406.

BibTeX

@article{suteja2020financial,
  title     = {{Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory}},
  author    = {Suteja, Jaja},
  journal   = {Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories \& scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan)},
  year      = {2020},
  doi       = {10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • agency theory
  • principal-agent problem
  • separation of ownership and control
  • managerial self-interest
  • managerial ownership
  • debt financing
  • bankruptcy risk
  • financial distress

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Suteja, J. (2020). Financial and Non-Financial Policies: An Examining of Agency Theory. Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan). https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

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Yes. It is open access at Universitas Pasundan institutional repositories & scientific journals (Universitas Pasundan): sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Jaja Suteja.

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10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406, permanently at https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.13298.94406. Sign in and open it from this page.

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