Journal article · 2020 · Open access

False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences

David Enoch

The Philosophical Review, 129(2), 159–210 · Published 1 January 2020 · DOI 10.2139/ssrn.3580987

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In brief

“False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences” is a 2020 journal article by David Enoch, published in The Philosophical Review. OpenAlex counts 83 citations as of 20 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.

Citations
83
Most cited in
2026 (24)
Field-weighted impact
9.83
References
59
Authors
1

Abstract

The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What matters is whether they suffer from an autonomy flaw. To answer this question, the author develops an account of autonomy failure, according to which a preference is nonautonomous if an injustice played an appropriate role in its causal history. The author then discusses the moral implications—and in an initial way, the political ones as well—of proclaiming a preference, or consent based on it, nonautonomous in this way.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Enoch, D. (2020). False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences. The Philosophical Review, 129(2), 159–210. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987

MLA 9

Enoch, David. “False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 129, no. 2, 2020, pp. 159–210. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987.

Chicago

Enoch, David. 2020. “False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.” The Philosophical Review 129 (2): 159–210. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987.

Harvard

Enoch, D. (2020) ‘False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences’, The Philosophical Review, 129(2), pp. 159–210. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3580987.

IEEE

D. Enoch, “False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 129, no. 2, pp. 159–210, 2020, doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3580987.

BibTeX

@article{enoch2020false,
  title     = {{False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences}},
  author    = {Enoch, David},
  journal   = {The Philosophical Review},
  year      = {2020},
  volume    = {129},
  number    = {2},
  pages     = {159--210},
  doi       = {10.2139/ssrn.3580987},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987}
}

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Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
201411
202011
202133
20221111
202366
20241515
20252222
20262424

Its field-weighted citation impact is 9.83: it has been cited 9.83 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics

  • false consciousness
  • consent
  • autonomy
  • adaptive preferences
  • injustice
  • liberalism
  • political philosophy

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Enoch, D. (2020). False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences. The Philosophical Review, 129(2), 159–210. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987

How many times has this paper been cited?

83 times, according to OpenAlex on 20 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at SSRN Electronic Journal: sign in and open the full text from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

David Enoch.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.2139/ssrn.3580987, permanently at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580987. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 20 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.