Journal article · 2006

Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies

Fan Ting

Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics · Published 1 January 2006

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In brief

“Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies” is a 2006 journal article by Fan Ting, published in Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 18 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.

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Abstract

This paper analyses on the factors about the executive compensation of Chinese publicly listed companies.We set up some hypotheses from firm performance,firm size,ownership structure and board structure.From the empirical researches,we find a significant positive association between executive compensation and firm performance,firm size.Lower the top blockholder owns,higher the compensation get.The proportion of independent directors on a… Read the full abstract at the publisher.

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Cite this paper

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APA 7

Ting, F. (2006). Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008

MLA 9

Ting, Fan. “Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies.” Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, 2006. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008.

Chicago

Ting, Fan. 2006. “Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies.” Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008.

Harvard

Ting, F. (2006) ‘Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies’, Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. Available at: https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008.

IEEE

F. Ting, “Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies,” Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, 2006.

BibTeX

@article{ting2006empirical,
  title     = {{Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies}},
  author    = {Ting, Fan},
  journal   = {Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics},
  year      = {2006},
  url       = {https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • executive compensation
  • Chinese listed companies
  • firm performance
  • firm size
  • ownership structure
  • board structure
  • independent directors
  • remuneration committee

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Ting, F. (2006). Empirical Research on the Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics. https://oversea.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&filename=NJJJ200606008

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

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Who wrote this paper?

Fan Ting.

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