Journal article · 2008 · Open access
Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis
Corporate Ownership and Control, 5(4), 119–127 · Published 1 January 2008 · DOI 10.22495/cocv5i4p11
In brief
“Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis” is a 2008 journal article by Feng-Li Lin and Tsangyao Chang, published in Corporate Ownership and Control. OpenAlex counts 7 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY-NC licence: the full text is free to read at Corporate Ownership and Control.
- Citations
- 7
- Most cited in
- 2023 (3)
- Field-weighted impact
- 0.47
- References
- 30
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
Two agency theories have dominated the corporate ownership debate, the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. Following the work of Ang et al. (2000) and Sing and Davidson (2003) to a panel of 266 Taiwanese listed companies for the 1996-2006 period, we adopt an advanced panel threshold regression model to determine whether managerial ownership reduces agency costs. We find when managerial ownership is less than 36.55% or greater than 59.06%, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership decreases asset utilization efficiency by 0.32% and 0.5%, respectively. However, managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Lin, F.-L., & Chang, T. (2008). Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis. Corporate Ownership and Control, 5(4), 119–127. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11
MLA 9
Lin, Feng-Li, and Tsangyao Chang. “Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis.” Corporate Ownership and Control, vol. 5, no. 4, 2008, pp. 119–127. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11.
Chicago
Lin, Feng-Li and Tsangyao Chang. 2008. “Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis.” Corporate Ownership and Control 5 (4): 119–127. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11.
Harvard
Lin, F.-L. and Chang, T. (2008) ‘Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis’, Corporate Ownership and Control, 5(4), pp. 119–127. doi:10.22495/cocv5i4p11.
IEEE
F.-L. Lin and T. Chang, “Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis,” Corporate Ownership and Control, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 119–127, 2008, doi: 10.22495/cocv5i4p11.
BibTeX
@article{lin2008does,
title = {{Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis}},
author = {Lin, Feng-Li and Chang, Tsangyao},
journal = {Corporate Ownership and Control},
year = {2008},
volume = {5},
number = {4},
pages = {119--127},
doi = {10.22495/cocv5i4p11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 1 | |
| 2023 | 3 | |
| 2024 | 1 | |
| 2026 | 1 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 0.47: it has been cited 0.47 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- managerial ownership
- agency costs
- entrenchment hypothesis
- interest convergence
- asset utilization efficiency
- corporate ownership structure
- Taiwan listed companies
- threshold effects
Work with this paper
Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureMichael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling · Journal of Financial Economics · 1976 · 77,585 citations
- Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformanceDouglass C. North · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1990 · 34,377 citations
- The MOS 36-item short-form health survey (SF-36). I. Conceptual framework and item selection.John E. Ware, Cathy Donald Sherbourne · PubMed · 1992 · 33,943 citations
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsManuel Arellano, Stephen R. Bond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1991 · 33,778 citations
- Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and TestingRobert F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger · Econometrica · 1987 · 32,847 citations
Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Lin, F.-L., & Chang, T. (2008). Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis. Corporate Ownership and Control, 5(4), 119–127. https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11
How many times has this paper been cited?
7 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at Corporate Ownership and Control.
Who wrote this paper?
Feng-Li Lin, Tsangyao Chang.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.22495/cocv5i4p11. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i4p11.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.