Journal article · 1981

Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions

Gordon Sick

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), 437 · Published 1 November 1981 · DOI 10.2307/2330364

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In brief

“Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions” is a 1981 journal article by Gordon Sick, published in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. OpenAlex counts 2 citations as of 15 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.

Citations
2
Field-weighted impact
1.05
References
4
Authors
1

Abstract

Gordon Sick, Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, Proceedings of 16th Annual Conference of the Western Finance Association, June 18-20, 1981, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Nov., 1981), pp. 437-438 Read the full abstract at the publisher.

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Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Sick, G. (1981). Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), 437. https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364

MLA 9

Sick, Gordon. “Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 16, no. 4, 1981, p. 437. https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364.

Chicago

Sick, Gordon. 1981. “Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 16 (4): 437. https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364.

Harvard

Sick, G. (1981) ‘Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), p. 437. doi:10.2307/2330364.

IEEE

G. Sick, “Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 16, no. 4, p. 437, 1981, doi: 10.2307/2330364.

BibTeX

@article{sick1981discussion,
  title     = {{Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions}},
  author    = {Sick, Gordon},
  journal   = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year      = {1981},
  volume    = {16},
  number    = {4},
  pages     = {437},
  doi       = {10.2307/2330364},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • information asymmetry
  • signaling
  • corporate financial decisions
  • optimal capital structure
  • investment decision-making

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Sick, G. (1981). Discussion: Asymmetric Information, Signaling, and Optimal Corporate Financial Decisions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), 437. https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364

How many times has this paper been cited?

2 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.

Who wrote this paper?

Gordon Sick.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.2307/2330364. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.2307/2330364.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.