Journal article · 2026

Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China

Huiyan Yang, Chun Cai

Applied Economics, 1–20 · Published 3 February 2026 · DOI 10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562

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In brief

“Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China” is a 2026 journal article by Huiyan Yang and Chun Cai, published in Applied Economics. OpenAlex counts 1 citations as of 19 November 2026. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.

Citations
1
Most cited in
2026 (1)
Field-weighted impact
2.64
References
53
Authors
2

Abstract

Digital government construction is profoundly reshaping the institutional environment for corporate operations. Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2010 to 2023, we investigate the impact of digital government development on corporate cash holdings. The findings suggest that digital government construction induces firms to increase cash holdings. Mechanism tests show that this increase is… Read the full abstract at the publisher.

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Cite this paper

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APA 7

Yang, H., & Cai, C. (2026). Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China. Applied Economics, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562

MLA 9

Yang, Huiyan, and Chun Cai. “Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China.” Applied Economics, 2026, pp. 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562.

Chicago

Yang, Huiyan and Chun Cai. 2026. “Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China.” Applied Economics: 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562.

Harvard

Yang, H. and Cai, C. (2026) ‘Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China’, Applied Economics, pp. 1–20. doi:10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562.

IEEE

H. Yang and C. Cai, “Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China,” Applied Economics, pp. 1–20, 2026, doi: 10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562.

BibTeX

@article{yang2026digital,
  title     = {{Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China}},
  author    = {Yang, Huiyan and Cai, Chun},
  journal   = {Applied Economics},
  year      = {2026},
  pages     = {1--20},
  doi       = {10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • cash holdings
  • precautionary motive
  • corporate liquidity management
  • administrative supervision
  • market competition
  • enterprise digital transformation
  • corporate governance
  • financial constraints

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Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Yang, H., & Cai, C. (2026). Digital government construction and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China. Applied Economics, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562

How many times has this paper been cited?

1 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.

Who wrote this paper?

Huiyan Yang, Chun Cai.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2026.2622562. Sign in and open it from this page.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.