Preprint · 1999 · Open access
Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Published 1 January 1999
In brief
“Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance” is a 1999 preprint by Roman Inderst and Holger M. Müller, published in RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. OpenAlex counts 3 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at MADOC (University of Mannheim).
- Citations
- 3
- Most cited in
- 2013 (1)
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
If ownership and control are separated, leaving the manager with discretion may be of value. This paper discusses the extent to which a firm's ownership structure may serve as a commitment for shareholders not to interfere with the manager's project decisions, thereby reducing the agency cost of debt. As shareholder passivity means granting the manager more freedom, the costs of this commitment are increased managerial on-the-job consumption and shirking. Trading off the costs and benefits of managerial discretion, we derive a unique optimal ownership concentration. The paper also establishes a link between firm growth and ownership structure, implying that firms with concentrated ownership may forego profitable investment opportunities even if there is no credit rationing. Moreover, the paper discusses the extent to which agency problems between shareholders and debtholders can be alleviated by delegating control to debtholders.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Inderst, R., & Müller, H. M. (1999). Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf
MLA 9
Inderst, Roman, and Holger M. Müller. “Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance.” RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 1999. https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf.
Chicago
Inderst, Roman and Holger M. Müller. 1999. “Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance.” RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf.
Harvard
Inderst, R. and Müller, H. M. (1999) ‘Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance’, RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. Available at: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf.
IEEE
R. Inderst and H. M. Müller, “Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance,” RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 1999.
BibTeX
@misc{inderst1999delegation,
title = {{Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance}},
author = {Inderst, Roman and Müller, Holger M.},
howpublished = {RePEc: Research Papers in Economics},
year = {1999},
url = {https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- delegation of control
- ownership concentration
- separation of ownership and control
- agency costs of debt
- managerial discretion
- business growth
- investment opportunities
- credit rationing
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Inderst, R., & Müller, H. M. (1999). Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics. https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2850/1/dp99_68.pdf
How many times has this paper been cited?
3 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at MADOC (University of Mannheim).
Who wrote this paper?
Roman Inderst, Holger M. Müller.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.