Journal article · 2016 · Open access

Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy

Fabrizio Rossi, Richard J. Cebula

Corporate Governance, 16(5), 883–905 · Published 3 October 2016 · DOI 10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025

Read the free full textView at the publisherCite this paper

In brief

“Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy” is a 2016 journal article by Fabrizio Rossi and Richard J. Cebula, published in Corporate Governance. OpenAlex counts 23 citations as of 15 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at SSRN Electronic Journal.

Citations
23
Most cited in
2020 (5)
Field-weighted impact
1.88
References
85
Authors
2

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the debt and ownership structure of a sample of Italian-listed companies to measure the role assumed in the control and monitoring of agency costs. Design/methodology/approach This study examines a balanced panel data, using both a random effects model and a generalized method of moments model to better capture any problems related to the endogeneity of the variables in the model. Findings The results provide evidence of a positive relationship between debt and ownership concentration on the one hand and a negative relationship between debt and institutional investors on the other hand. The debt seems to assume both functions, i.e. the disciplinary role of substitute at low levels of ownership concentration and a complementary role at high levels of ownership concentration. Practical implications This study provides three practical implications. The first is that the complementarity between debt and ownership concentration provides evidence of the entrenchment effect and tends to weaken the company financially. Second, the results also provide useful prompts to policy-makers who should encourage the presence of institutional investors. Third, the policy-makers should also encourage the expansion of the stock market to enhance the protection of shareholders, reduce private control benefits and provide Italy the same opportunities as other common and civil law countries to collect risk capital, avoiding the abuse of debt. Originality/value The empirical results suggest that ownership concentration increases the degree of corporate debt, whereas institutional investors assume the disciplinary role of monitoring and controlling agency costs. The results provide evidence of both the entrenchment effect and the alignment-of-interests hypothesis and that the expropriation theory seems to prevail over the control and monitoring role.

Cite this paper

Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.

APA 7

Rossi, F., & Cebula, R. J. (2016). Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy. Corporate Governance, 16(5), 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025

MLA 9

Rossi, Fabrizio, and Richard J. Cebula. “Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy.” Corporate Governance, vol. 16, no. 5, 2016, pp. 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025.

Chicago

Rossi, Fabrizio and Richard J. Cebula. 2016. “Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy.” Corporate Governance 16 (5): 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025.

Harvard

Rossi, F. and Cebula, R. J. (2016) ‘Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy’, Corporate Governance, 16(5), pp. 883–905. doi:10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025.

IEEE

F. Rossi and R. J. Cebula, “Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy,” Corporate Governance, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 883–905, 2016, doi: 10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025.

BibTeX

@article{rossi2016debt,
  title     = {{Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy}},
  author    = {Rossi, Fabrizio and Cebula, Richard J.},
  journal   = {Corporate Governance},
  year      = {2016},
  volume    = {16},
  number    = {5},
  pages     = {883--905},
  doi       = {10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025}
}

Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)

Citations by year

YearCitationsShare of the best year
201833
201911
202055
202144
202222
202433
202522
202633

Its field-weighted citation impact is 1.88: it has been cited 1.88 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).

Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • corporate debt
  • ownership structure
  • ownership concentration
  • institutional investors
  • agency costs
  • entrenchment effect
  • Italian listed companies
  • stock market development

Work with this paper

Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance

All highly cited Economics, Econometrics and Finance papers

Questions about this paper

How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Rossi, F., & Cebula, R. J. (2016). Debt and ownership structure: evidence from Italy. Corporate Governance, 16(5), 883–905. https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025

How many times has this paper been cited?

23 times, according to OpenAlex on 15 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at SSRN Electronic Journal.

Who wrote this paper?

Fabrizio Rossi, Richard J. Cebula.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.1108/cg-02-2016-0025.

Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 15 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.