Preprint · 2026 · Open access

De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights

Vikas Agarwal, Oğuzhan Karakaş, Peter Limbach, Honglin Ren

Published 1 January 2026 · DOI 10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026

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In brief

“De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights” is a 2026 preprint by Vikas Agarwal and 3 co-authors. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 18 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read.

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Abstract

We document high persistence in shareholder turnout, creating predictable differences in effective voting power across firms. Accordingly, firms with lower turnout exhibit higher voting premia. For identification, we exploit the 2010 NYSE Rule 452 amendment eliminating broker authority over uninstructed shares as a shock to turnout in director elections. Further, we show that low turnout predicts contentious governance events where shareholder influence is more valuable, and that the negative voting premium-turnout relation is stronger when such events are more likely. Results indicate that persistent shareholder participation shapes de facto voting power, which investors price into the value of corporate control.

Cite this paper

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APA 7

Agarwal, V., Karakaş, O., Limbach, P., & Ren, H. (2026). De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights. https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026

MLA 9

Agarwal, Vikas, et al. “De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights.” 2026. https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026.

Chicago

Agarwal, Vikas, Oğuzhan Karakaş, Peter Limbach, and Honglin Ren. 2026. “De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights.” https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026.

Harvard

Agarwal, V. et al. (2026) ‘De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights’. doi:10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026.

IEEE

V. Agarwal, O. Karakaş, P. Limbach, and H. Ren, “De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights,” 2026, doi: 10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026.

BibTeX

@misc{agarwal2026facto,
  title     = {{De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights}},
  author    = {Agarwal, Vikas and Karakaş, Oğuzhan and Limbach, Peter and Ren, Honglin},
  year      = {2026},
  doi       = {10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance

  • corporate governance
  • corporate control
  • shareholder participation
  • value of control

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Agarwal, V., Karakaş, O., Limbach, P., & Ren, H. (2026). De Facto Voting Power and the Value of Voting Rights. https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

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Who wrote this paper?

Vikas Agarwal, Oğuzhan Karakaş, Peter Limbach, Honglin Ren.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026, permanently at https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1156-2026. Sign in and open it from this page.

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