Paper · 2002 · Open access
Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors
Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), 44(3), 153–183 · Published 20 December 2002
In brief
“Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors” is a 2002 paper by 正晴 稲別 and Masaharu Inabetsu, published in Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB). OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 19 November 2026. It is open access: the full text is free to read at Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB).
- Citations
- 0
- References
- 16
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
The separation of ownership and control in large publicly held corporations leads to agency problems between shareholders and top management. The main agency problem is that top management as agents of shareholders may be tempted to act opportunistically and seek their own interests rather than share holders’ interests. The compelling issue is how to mitigate this temptation and according to the agency theory, there are two governance mechanisms. One is external monitoring from efficient capital markets, that is a takeover as last resort for protection of shareholders. Another is internal monitoring by a board of directors. It seems that the 1980s takeover frenzy disciplined poor management and brought efficient management. But, the broad-based public backlash against hostile takeovers, debt-based financing and anti-takeover defense resulted in the collapse of the takeover market in the 1990s. At the same time, there has been the movement to empower boards of directors who monitor management on behalf of the shareholders. They are the board of directors with majority of outside directors, securing of independence of outsider directors, having committees such as audit, nominating, compensation, and so on. For much of the last decade, the American corporations have been admired as a standard-bearer of corporate governance. However, a recent series of accounting scandals badly shook the American corporate system itself. President Bush hastened to sign into law the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, which aims to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Also, NYSE approved significant changes in its listing standards to restore investor confidence. These reforms include strengthening of disclosure and corporate governance, as well as placing large penalties for breaking rules. Taking these incidents into consideration, it is very important to reconsider the role of boards of directors as an internal control system. This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the background of this study. Section 2 summarizes the reforms toward the strengthening of monitoring function of the board of directors in past thirty years in the United States. Section 3 discusses the ratification and monitoring role of boards of directors in new perspectives. Section 4 discusses institutional shareholder activism. Section 5 concludes and suggests further research.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
稲別, 正., & Inabetsu, M. (2002). Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors. Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), 44(3), 153–183. https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584
MLA 9
稲別, 正晴, and Masaharu Inabetsu. “Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors.” Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), vol. 44, no. 3, 2002, pp. 153–183. https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584.
Chicago
稲別, 正晴 and Masaharu Inabetsu. 2002. “Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors.” Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) 44 (3): 153–183. https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584.
Harvard
稲別, 正. and Inabetsu, M. (2002) ‘Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors’, Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), 44(3), pp. 153–183. Available at: https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584.
IEEE
正. 稲別 and M. Inabetsu, “Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors,” Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 153–183, 2002.
BibTeX
@article{2002corprate,
title = {{Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors}},
author = {稲別, 正晴 and Inabetsu, Masaharu},
journal = {Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB)},
year = {2002},
volume = {44},
number = {3},
pages = {153--183},
url = {https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- corporate governance
- board of directors
- agency theory
- separation of ownership and control
- hostile takeovers
- takeover defenses
- board independence
- independent directors
Work with this paper
Most-cited papers in Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureMichael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling · Journal of Financial Economics · 1976 · 77,585 citations
- Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic PerformanceDouglass C. North · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 1990 · 34,377 citations
- The MOS 36-item short-form health survey (SF-36). I. Conceptual framework and item selection.John E. Ware, Cathy Donald Sherbourne · PubMed · 1992 · 33,943 citations
- Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment EquationsManuel Arellano, Stephen R. Bond · The Review of Economic Studies · 1991 · 33,778 citations
- Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and TestingRobert F. Engle, C.W.J. Granger · Econometrica · 1987 · 32,847 citations
Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
稲別, 正., & Inabetsu, M. (2002). Corprate Gavernance and Boards of Directors. Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB), 44(3), 153–183. https://stars.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/4584
How many times has this paper been cited?
0 times, according to OpenAlex on 19 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB): sign in and open the PDF from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
正晴 稲別, Masaharu Inabetsu.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 19 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.