Journal article · 2026 · Open access
Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps
Journal of the ACM, 73(5), 1–51 · Published 17 September 2026 · DOI 10.1145/3848506
In brief
“Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps” is a 2026 journal article by Christian Kroer and Dominik Peters, published in Journal of the ACM. OpenAlex counts 8 citations as of 17 November 2026, which puts it in the top 8% of works published in 2026 by citations. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at Journal of the ACM.
- Citations
- 8
- Most cited in
- 2026 (6)
- Field-weighted impact
- 19.80
- References
- 88
- Authors
- 2
Abstract
Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness properties. We consider a model where agents have separable linear utility functions over the public goods, and the output assigns to each good an amount of spending, summing to at most the available budget. In the uncapped setting, each of the public goods can absorb any amount of funding. In this case, it is known that Lindahl equilibrium is equivalent to maximizing Nash social welfare, and this allocation can be computed by a public-goods variant of the proportional response dynamics. We introduce a new convex programming formulation for computing this solution and show that it is related to Nash welfare maximization through double duality and reformulation. We then show that the proportional response dynamics is equivalent to running mirror descent on our new formulation, thereby providing a new and very immediate proof of the convergence guarantee for the dynamics. Our new formulation has similarities to Shmyrev’s convex program for Fisher market equilibrium. In the capped setting, each public good has an upper bound on the amount of funding it can receive, which is a type of constraint that appears in fractional committee selection and participatory budgeting. In this setting, existence of Lindahl equilibrium was only known via fixed-point arguments. The existence of an efficient algorithm computing one has been a long-standing open question. We prove that our new convex program continues to work when the cap constraints are added, and its optimal solutions are Lindahl equilibria. Thus, we establish that approximate Lindahl equilibrium can be efficiently computed in the capped setting to any desired accuracy. Our result also implies that approximately core-stable allocations can be efficiently computed for the class of separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Kroer, C., & Peters, D. (2026). Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps. Journal of the ACM, 73(5), 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506
MLA 9
Kroer, Christian, and Dominik Peters. “Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps.” Journal of the ACM, vol. 73, no. 5, 2026, pp. 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506.
Chicago
Kroer, Christian and Dominik Peters. 2026. “Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps.” Journal of the ACM 73 (5): 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506.
Harvard
Kroer, C. and Peters, D. (2026) ‘Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps’, Journal of the ACM, 73(5), pp. 1–51. doi:10.1145/3848506.
IEEE
C. Kroer and D. Peters, “Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps,” Journal of the ACM, vol. 73, no. 5, pp. 1–51, 2026, doi: 10.1145/3848506.
BibTeX
@article{kroer2026computing,
title = {{Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps}},
author = {Kroer, Christian and Peters, Dominik},
journal = {Journal of the ACM},
year = {2026},
volume = {73},
number = {5},
pages = {1--51},
doi = {10.1145/3848506},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Lindahl equilibrium
- public goods
- convex optimization
- mirror descent
- Nash social welfare
- core stability
- participatory budgeting
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Kroer, C., & Peters, D. (2026). Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps. Journal of the ACM, 73(5), 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506
How many times has this paper been cited?
8 times, according to OpenAlex on 17 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access at Journal of the ACM: sign in and open the full text from this page.
Who wrote this paper?
Christian Kroer, Dominik Peters.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.1145/3848506, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1145/3848506. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 17 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.