Journal article · 2026 · Open access

Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China

Song Wu, Xinrui Zhang, Yan Zhu, Yao Yao, Qian Luo

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 13(1) · Published 20 June 2026 · DOI 10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y

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In brief

“Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China” is a 2026 journal article by Song Wu and 4 co-authors, published in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 18 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY-NC-ND licence: the full text is free to read at Humanities and Social Sciences Communications.

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Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) technology becomes prevalent, “AI Wash”—the practice of firms exaggerating their AI capabilities to meet market expectations—has drawn increasing concern, posing a potential threat to capital market efficiency and the health of the technological ecosystem. This study focuses on the Board Interlock Network (BN), a key informal governance mechanism, to investigate its efficacy in governing corporate AI Wash. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 and employing a Double Machine Learning (DML) model for causal inference, we find that the BN significantly inhibits corporate AI Wash. This finding remains robust after a series of robustness and endogeneity tests. Mechanism tests provide strong support for our core argument: the BN inhibits AI Wash by significantly enhancing both the breadth (number of reports) and depth (length of reports) of media attention. This heightened media scrutiny amplifies the potential reputational costs and exposure risks associated with opportunistic disclosure, thereby effectively inhibiting such behavior. Further heterogeneity analysis aligns with our theoretical predictions: the inhibitory effect of board interlocks is more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetry (e.g., high-technology firms), more complex governance needs (e.g., state-owned enterprises), and stronger external monitoring pressures (e.g., intense market competition). The core contribution of this study lies in revealing a synergistic governance effect between internal governance (interlocking directorates) and external information intermediaries (the media). It provides a novel pathway and empirical evidence for understanding how the BN can inhibit speculative behavior in emerging technology sectors by shaping the corporate information environment.

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APA 7

Wu, S., Zhang, X., Zhu, Y., Yao, Y., & Luo, Q. (2026). Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 13(1). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y

MLA 9

Wu, Song, et al. “Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, vol. 13, no. 1, 2026. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y.

Chicago

Wu, Song, Xinrui Zhang, Yan Zhu, Yao Yao, and Qian Luo. 2026. “Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China.” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 13 (1). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y.

Harvard

Wu, S. et al. (2026) ‘Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China’, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 13(1). doi:10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y.

IEEE

S. Wu, X. Zhang, Y. Zhu, Y. Yao, and Q. Luo, “Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, vol. 13, no. 1, 2026, doi: 10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y.

BibTeX

@article{wu2026board,
  title     = {{Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China}},
  author    = {Wu, Song and Zhang, Xinrui and Zhu, Yan and Yao, Yao and Luo, Qian},
  journal   = {Humanities and Social Sciences Communications},
  year      = {2026},
  volume    = {13},
  number    = {1},
  doi       = {10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y}
}

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Topic and keywords

Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance

  • media attention
  • corporate governance
  • information asymmetry
  • state-owned enterprises
  • market competition
  • corporate reputation
  • speculative behavior
  • Chinese listed companies

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How do I cite this paper in APA style?

Wu, S., Zhang, X., Zhu, Y., Yao, Y., & Luo, Q. (2026). Board interlock network: regulatory allies or collusive pushers in AI wash?—An empirical test based on listed companies in China. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 13(1). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y

How many times has this paper been cited?

0 times, according to OpenAlex on 18 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.

Is this paper free to read?

Yes. It is open access at Humanities and Social Sciences Communications: sign in and open the PDF from this page.

Who wrote this paper?

Song Wu, Xinrui Zhang, Yan Zhu, Yao Yao, Qian Luo.

What is the DOI of this paper?

10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y, permanently at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-07999-y. Sign in and open it from this page.

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