Review article · 2025 · Open access
Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review
Journal of Finance and Accounting, 13(6), 236–243 · Published 3 December 2025 · DOI 10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11
In brief
“Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review” is a 2025 review article by Alaa Kafa, published in Journal of Finance and Accounting. OpenAlex counts 0 citations as of 16 November 2026. It is open access under a CC BY licence: the full text is free to read at Journal of Finance and Accounting.
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Abstract
This literature review aims to scrutinize and elucidate the intricate theoretical and applied framework surrounding the pervasive issue of agency costs, specifically within the dynamic milieu of financial markets. The analysis delves into the foundational concept of agency costs, meticulously examining their distinct typologies, their multifaceted interpretation by market participants, and their profound economic ramifications. The genesis of this principal-agent problem is inextricably linked to the defining characteristic of the modern corporation: the separation of ownership from control. This fundamental division creates a inherent conflict of interest, wherein management (the agent) may prioritize personal goals-such as excessive perquisite consumption, empire building, or shirking-over the paramount objective of maximizing shareholder wealth (the principal). This divergence is critically intensified by pervasive information asymmetry, where managers inherently possess superior knowledge about the firm's true performance and prospects compared to dispersed owners. The theoretical underpinnings of this study are firmly rooted in the seminal contributions of Berle and Means, who first identified the implications of separated ownership and control, and Jensen and Meckling, who formally defined agency costs. The review systematically identifies and categorizes the principal manifestations of agency costs, framing them according to their association with the specific behavioral incentives and cultural-institutional characteristics of both the contracting parties and their broader economic environment. Two predominant patterns are rigorously delineated: first, the classical vertical conflict between corporate management and all shareholders, and second, the horizontal conflict between controlling shareholders (who often exert significant influence over management) and minority shareholders, who are vulnerable to expropriation through tunneling or unfair related-party transactions. For each archetype, the synthesis critically analyzes the empirical findings of previous scholarly work concerning their distinct economic consequences, which range from direct wealth transfers and suboptimal investment decisions to broader macroeconomic impacts like reduced market efficiency and impeded capital formation. Furthermore, the review proactively explores unresolved research particularly in the context of evolving market structures, regulatory landscapes, and global corporate governance norms.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Kafa, A. (2025). Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 13(6), 236–243. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11
MLA 9
Kafa, Alaa. “Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review.” Journal of Finance and Accounting, vol. 13, no. 6, 2025, pp. 236–243. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11.
Chicago
Kafa, Alaa. 2025. “Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review.” Journal of Finance and Accounting 13 (6): 236–243. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11.
Harvard
Kafa, A. (2025) ‘Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review’, Journal of Finance and Accounting, 13(6), pp. 236–243. doi:10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11.
IEEE
A. Kafa, “Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review,” Journal of Finance and Accounting, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 236–243, 2025, doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11.
BibTeX
@article{kafa2025agency,
title = {{Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review}},
author = {Kafa, Alaa},
journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
year = {2025},
volume = {13},
number = {6},
pages = {236--243},
doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11}
}
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Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- agency costs
- principal-agent problem
- separation of ownership and control
- information asymmetry
- managerial incentives
- tunneling
- related-party transactions
- minority shareholder expropriation
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Kafa, A. (2025). Agency Costs in the Context of Financial Markets: Concept, Types, and Economic Consequences: A Literature Review. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 13(6), 236–243. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11
How many times has this paper been cited?
0 times, according to OpenAlex on 16 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
Yes. It is open access: read the free full text at Journal of Finance and Accounting.
Who wrote this paper?
Alaa Kafa.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11. The permanent link is https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20251306.11.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 16 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; the links go to the publisher or the repository that does.