Journal article · 2007
1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control
Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64 · Published 1 December 2007 · DOI 10.5465/078559806
In brief
“1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control” is a 2007 journal article by Dan R. Dalton and 3 co-authors, published in Academy of Management Annals. OpenAlex counts 1,105 citations as of 20 November 2026, which puts it in the top 1% of works published in 2007 by citations. The publisher's version is not open access, and OpenAlex records no free legal copy.
- Citations
- 1,105
- Most cited in
- 2024 (116)
- Field-weighted impact
- 16.08
- References
- 379
- Authors
- 4
Abstract
A central tenet of agency theory is that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and managers diverge. In those circumstances, and for a variety of reasons, managers may be able to exact higher rents than are reasonable or than the owners of the firm would otherwise accord them. While that foundational… Read the full abstract at the publisher.
Excerpt. This paper is not open access.
Cite this paper
Formatted from the catalogue record. Check names, capitals and page numbers against the paper before you submit.
APA 7
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806
MLA 9
Dalton, Dan R., et al. “1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control.” Academy of Management Annals, vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806.
Chicago
Dalton, Dan R., Michael A. Hitt, S. Trevis Certo, and Catherine M. Dalton. 2007. “1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control.” Academy of Management Annals 1 (1): 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806.
Harvard
Dalton, D. R. et al. (2007) ‘1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control’, Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), pp. 1–64. doi:10.5465/078559806.
IEEE
D. R. Dalton, M. A. Hitt, S. T. Certo, and C. M. Dalton, “1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control,” Academy of Management Annals, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–64, 2007, doi: 10.5465/078559806.
BibTeX
@article{dalton2007fundamental,
title = {{1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control}},
author = {Dalton, Dan R. and Hitt, Michael A. and Certo, S. Trevis and Dalton, Catherine M.},
journal = {Academy of Management Annals},
year = {2007},
volume = {1},
number = {1},
pages = {1--64},
doi = {10.5465/078559806},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806}
}
Download for a reference manager: BibTeX (.bib) · RIS for Zotero, Mendeley and EndNote (.ris)
Citations by year
| Year | Citations | Share of the best year |
|---|---|---|
| 2017 | 66 | |
| 2018 | 91 | |
| 2019 | 61 | |
| 2020 | 74 | |
| 2021 | 73 | |
| 2022 | 78 | |
| 2023 | 78 | |
| 2024 | 116 | |
| 2025 | 83 | |
| 2026 | 59 |
Its field-weighted citation impact is 16.08: it has been cited 16.08 times as often as the average work of the same field, type and year (1.00 is the world average).
Topic and keywords
Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- agency theory
- managerial autonomy
- equity
- market for corporate control
- corporate governance
Work with this paper
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Questions about this paper
How do I cite this paper in APA style?
Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). 1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806
How many times has this paper been cited?
1,105 times, according to OpenAlex on 20 November 2026. Google Scholar and Scopus count different sets of sources, so their numbers differ.
Is this paper free to read?
OpenAlex records no free legal copy. Check your library's access, the authors' pages or a repository, or ask the corresponding author for a copy.
Who wrote this paper?
Dan R. Dalton, Michael A. Hitt, S. Trevis Certo, Catherine M. Dalton.
What is the DOI of this paper?
10.5465/078559806, permanently at https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806. Sign in and open it from this page.
Bibliographic data from OpenAlex (CC0), last checked 20 November 2026. ResearchGuru does not host this paper; once you are signed in, the links open it at the publisher or the repository that does.